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“The right to a fair trial is also an inconvenient right.”1 It has long been
recognized that the right to confront, impeach, and cross-examine adverse
witnesses in a criminal trial is the cornerstone of the defendant’s right to a fair
trial. Dean J.H. Wigmore explained that the right to confrontation serves a
principal purpose:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent
demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of crossexamination, which cannot be had except by direct and personal
putting of questions and obtaining of immediate answers.2
He described cross-examination as “the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth.”3 More recently, Justice Hugo Black described the
importance of cross-examination: “It is only when the witnesses are present and
subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their
testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury
which so long has been the hallmark of ‘even handed justice.’” 4
The right to confrontation has never been viewed as an absolute right.
Although the primary goal of the adversarial trial process is to ascertain the truth,
other important societal values, such as fairness to the parties and public

1. Laura Hoyano, What Is Balanced on the Scales of Justice? In Search of the Essence of
the Right to a Fair Trial, 1 CRIM. L. REV. 4, 28 (2014) (Eng.).
2. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395 (2d ed. 1923). Much of this discussion that follows
is from the Author’s previous article, Deborah Paruch, Silencing the Victims in Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The Confrontation Clause and Children’s Hearsay Statements Before and After
Michigan v. Bryant, 28 TOURO L. REV. 85 (2012).
3. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1972), quoted in RONALD
JOSEPH DELISLE ET AL., EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 533 (11th ed. 2015) (Can.).
4. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting
Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)); see also Mark S. Brodin, The
British Experience with Hearsay Reform: A Cautionary Tale, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1417, 1426–
27 (2016) (cautioning about the detrimental consequences that emerged when the United Kingdom
loosened its requirements of cross-examination); Bruce P. Archibald, The Canadian Hearsay
Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf at All?, 25 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 6–9 (1999) (Can.)
(noting the importance of cross-examination in the Canadian legal system).
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confidence in the integrity of the process, are at stake.5 As a result of these
competing values, there is significant controversy surrounding the admission of
hearsay in criminal trials.6 The controversy centers on when hearsay aids the
truth-seeking process, when it impedes the process, and how it affects other
values at stake.7
The operation of the hearsay rule, specifically as it relates to the right of
accused persons to confront a witness against them, has undergone substantial
development and change, received significant academic attention, and generated
significant debate in the past few decades in the United States, Canada, and
Europe.8 The result has been three markedly diverse legal doctrines. The U.S.
confrontation clause jurisprudence focuses its attention on the nature of the
hearsay statement and whether the statement is a “testimonial statement.” 9
Under this doctrine, the key inquiry is whether the declarant or the interrogator
intended the statements to be the equivalent of testimony at time they were
made.10 If so, the statements are not admissible at trial unless it is shown that
the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for crossexamination.11 Canadian courts, on the other hand, crafted what is known as the
principled approach.12 Under this doctrine, hearsay is admitted in criminal trials
provided it is shown to be both necessary and reliable.13 Finally, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that untested hearsay statements
found to be the sole or decisive evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial
should not be admitted unless sufficient counterbalancing factors are present to
compensate for the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the admission of
this untested evidence.14
Part I of this Article sets out a short discussion of the history of the right to
confrontation. Part II contains a detailed discussion of the treatment of hearsay
in criminal trials in the United States, Canada, and the ECtHR. It shows the
5. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 7–9.
6. Id. at 7–8 (“Much controversy over the hearsay rules, of course, is centered on questions
of when they help and when they hinder truth-finding.”).
7. Id. at 7–10.
8. The Author has not examined the individual countries in Europe, rather focuses on the
European Court of Human Rights decisions.
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821–22 (2006).
10. See, e.g., id. at 822 (“[Statements] are testimonial when . . . the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”).
11. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, Canada’s Empirically-Based Child Competency Test and Its
Principled Approach to Hearsay, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 513, 533–39 (2014) (Can.)
(“Under this ‘principled’ approach, hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, and the onus
is on the Crown to establish the statement’s admissibility as reliable and necessary.”).
13. See, e.g., R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 546 (Can.) (“[T]he reception of hearsay
evidence in this case is justified on grounds of necessity and reliability.”).
14. Al-Khawaja v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, 253 (“The question . . . is
whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including measures that permit a fair
and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place.”).
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evolution of the doctrine within each jurisdiction and includes commentary from
scholars and courts identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.
Part III begins with a comparative analysis of the doctrines from these
jurisdictions. The Author moves on to analyze and predict how the key cases
from each jurisdiction would likely be decided by each of the other two
jurisdictions, illustrating the markedly different outcomes that would likely
occur. Finally, the Author identifies lessons that the U.S. Supreme Court could
learn from Canada and the ECtHR, and argues that the Supreme Court should
adopt a modified version of the doctrine established by the ECtHR to best protect
a defendant’s right to a fair trial while also serving the other competing values
at play in criminal trials.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
An accused’s right to confrontation has its origins in Roman law15 and the
common law of England.16 In the common law of England, the development of
“the hearsay rule, as a distinct and living idea,” did not begin until the sixteenth
century and did not reach full development until the early eighteenth century.17
The process of obtaining information from persons who were not called as
witnesses was common practice in trials in England during the fifteenth
century.18 In fact, it was standard practice for jurors to confer privately with
witnesses outside of court, where the witnesses would “inform” the juror.19 This
practice was described by Chief Justice Fortescue in 1450, “[i]f the jurors come
to a man where he lives, in the country, to have knowledge of the truth of the
matter, and he informs them, it is justifiable.”20 Jurors may have been provided
with a “counsel’s report” that documented what a witness might have said or
predicted what the witness would likely say about the matter before the court.21
During this time, there was little to no objection to the use of these types of outof-court statements at trial.22
15. Similar to the United States, Roman criminal procedure was accusatorial in nature. The
accusing individual, the “accusator,” was responsible for prosecuting the defendant and had the
burden of proving the charge. Witness testimony was the principal evidence. The accusator was
required to be present in court to state the charge. Defendants were also entitled to be present.
There was a preference for testimony of witnesses in court where they were subject to cross
examination. Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and
Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 484–89 (1994).
16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“The [English] common-law tradition
is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing . . . .”).
17. John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904).
18. Id. at 438–39.
19. Id. at 440.
20. Id. (quoting YB 28 Hen. 6, fol. 6, Pasch, pl. 1 (1450) (Eng.), as translated in JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 129 (1898)).
21. Id. at 441.
22. Id. at 440–41. Actually, the process of producing fact witnesses at trial was discouraged.
Compulsory process for witnesses was not provided until 1562–1563. Id.
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During the seventeenth century, juries came to depend, with increased
frequency, on in-court testimony as their chief source of information.23 At this
time, a sense of impropriety developed around the use of out-of-court statements
based principally on the notion that these statements should be admitted only if
the person affected by them had an opportunity to test their trustworthiness by
means of cross-examination.24 During this time, considerable thought was being
given to the quantity and reliability of the evidence that would allow jurors to
reach a correct decision. Statutes and other rules were passed that addressed
topics such as “good and sufficient” or “good and lawful” proofs.25 As a result
of these transformations, courts began to question “whether a hearsay thus laid
before [a jury] would suffice.”26 They began to challenge the validity of verdicts
where the evidence presented at trial consisted solely of hearsay.27
Many accounts of the history of the right to confrontation cite the infamous
prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603.28 The most damaging
evidence presented by the prosecution was a statement Lord Cobham gave
during an interrogation conducted in the Tower of London in which he alleged
that Raleigh was the instigator of the plan to overthrow the King.29 During the
trial, records of this interrogation were read to the jury.30 Raleigh denied the
charges and demanded that the court call Cobham to appear at trial.31 The court
denied his request, convicted him, and sentenced him to death.32

23. Id. at 441.
24. See id. at 448.
25. Id. at 441–42.
26. Id. at 442.
27. Id. at 442–43. For example, a discussion was raised whether the requirement for a
conviction for treason, which required evidence from two accusers, could be satisfied if one was
by hearsay. Id.; see also R. v. Thomas (1553) 73 Eng. Rep. 218, 218–19 (K.B.) (“[I]t was there
holden for law, that of two accusors, if one be an accusor of his own knowledge, or of his own
hearing, and he relate it to another, the other may well be an accusor . . . .”).
28. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). Raleigh was charged with
conspiring against King James by raising money abroad to distribute to rebels with the objective of
having Arabella Stuart placed on the throne. See Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its
History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 388 (1959).
29. Jacqueline Forsgren Cronkhite, Comment, Signed, Sealed, Delivered . . .
Unconstitutional: The Effect of Melendez-Diaz on the Use of Notarized Crime Laboratory Reports
in Arkansas, 63 ARK. L. REV. 757, 761 (2010).
30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
31. Id. For a transcript of Sir Raleigh’s trial, see 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 400
(1832).
32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. It is reported that one of the judges responding to Raleigh’s
request stated: “[M]any horse-stealers may escape, if they may not be condemned without
witnesses.” Miller v. Indiana, 517 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind. 1987) (quoting Kenneth W. Graham, The
Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL. 99, 100 (1972)).
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During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, courts began to question
the practice of freely admitting hearsay.33 At this time however, the law
distinguished hearsay statements made under oath from those that were not.34
As such, it was common practice to have a sworn statement read aloud to the
jury and for the deponent to confirm it by indicating that it was freely and
voluntarily made.35 By the end of the seventeenth century, this practice of
admitting sworn extrajudicial statements was abandoned in favor of one that
required the testimony of the witness in court.36 Two trials decided in 1696, R.
v. Paine37 and Fenwick’s Trial,38 appear to have solidified the rule that hearsay
statements, including those given under oath, should not be admitted if there was
no prior opportunity for cross-examination. In Paine, the declarant gave a
deposition under oath in front of the Mayor of Bristol but died before the trial.39
The King’s Bench remarked, “these depositions should not be given in evidence,
the defendant not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so
had lost the benefit of a cross-examination.”40
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The United States’ Jurisprudence
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”41
In criminal trials, the question of whether hearsay is admissible involves two
distinct legal issues: first, whether the out-of-court statements are admissible
under the established evidentiary rules; and second, whether the admission of
hearsay statements violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
In California v. Green,42 the U.S. Supreme Court noted:

33. See Wigmore, supra note 17, at 441–42.
34. See id. at 447–48, 450–51.
35. Id. at 451.
36. Id. at 451–52, 454–56.
37. R. v. Paine (1696) 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (K.B.).
38. Fenwick’s Trial (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 596 (Eng.) (proceedings in the House of
Commons).
39. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 584.
40. Id. at 585.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Amendment was proposed to Congress in 1789 and adopted
in 1791. See H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85–88 (1789); see also Steve Mount, Ratification
of Constitutional Amendments, USCONSTITUTION.NET, http://www.usconstitution.net/constamrat.
html (last modified Nov. 11, 2010) (stating the dates that states ratified the Bill of Rights; Virginia
was the eleventh state to ratify on December 15, 1791, providing the required majority of eleven
out of fourteen states).
42. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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[W]e have more than once found a violation of confrontation values
even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably
recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely
because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay
rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights
have been denied.43
1. Ohio v. Roberts
The discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s modern Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence begins with its 1980 opinion in Ohio v. Roberts.44 The issue
before the Court was whether an unavailable declarant’s preliminary hearing
testimony, obtained without cross-examination, could be admitted in a
subsequent criminal trial on the same matter.45 In this case, the defendant was
arrested and charged with forging checks and possession of stolen credit cards
belonging to the parents of the declarant, Anita Isaacs. At the preliminary
hearing, defendant’s attorney called Isaacs to the stand.46 Although he tried to
get her to admit that she had given defendant the checks and credit cards, she
denied doing so. He did not request to treat her as a hostile witness and the
prosecutor did not question her.47
Isaacs was unavailable to testify at the trial.48 The defendant took the stand
and testified that she had given him the credit cards and checks.49 The trial court
admitted the transcript of Isaac’s testimony at the preliminary hearing over
defendant’s objections.50 The jury convicted the defendant on all counts.51
The Supreme Court began its discussion by noting that although the
Confrontation Clause prefers “face-to-face confrontation at trial,” this right is

43. Id. at 155–56 (first citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); and then citing Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
44. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s early decisions addressing
the right to confrontation, see Brief for Petitioner at 18–21, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940. See also Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a
Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 49–50 (2005).
45. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 59 (“Between November 1975 and March 1976, five subpoenas . . . were issued to
Anita at her parents’ Ohio residence. The last three carried a written instruction that Anita should
‘call before appearing.’ . . . She did not telephone and she did not appear at trial.”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 59–60. The prosecution relied on an Ohio statute that permitted “the use of
preliminary examination testimony of a witness who ‘cannot for any reason be produced at the
trial.’” Id. at 59 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (West 1975)). The trial court conducted
a voir dire hearing in response to the defendant’s objections. Amy Isaacs, Anita’s mother, was the
only witness at voir dire. Upon her testimony in which she stated that she had no way to reach her
daughter, the court admitted the transcript into evidence. Id. at 59–60.
51. Id. at 60.
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not absolute.52 It stated that “general rules of law of this kind, however
beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”53
The Court explained that the Confrontation Clause operates in two distinct
ways to restrict the scope of admissible hearsay. First, a rule of necessity is
implicit in the Sixth Amendment, which requires that the hearsay declarant be
unavailable at trial.54 Second, the Confrontation Clause only allows the
admission of hearsay evidence that is found to be trustworthy—statements must
bear adequate “indicia of reliability.”55 The Court concluded that Anita Isaacs’
preliminary examination testimony bore sufficient “indicia of reliability”
because defendant’s attorney was able to challenge her testimony at the
preliminary hearing with the “equivalent of significant cross-examination.”56
The approach set forth in Roberts was strongly criticized, and it was not long
before scholars and several justices of the Supreme Court began to advocate for
its replacement.57 Criticism of the Roberts test centered on several grounds: the
test was criticized for being at odds with the history, purpose, text, and structure
of the Confrontation Clause;58 for “robbing the confrontation right of any

52. Id. at 63.
53. Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 259–60 (1895) (Shiras, J.,
dissenting)).
54. Id. at 65.
55. Id. at 65–66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)). The Court also stated
that reliability could be inferred where the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
If not, then it may still be admitted upon “a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.” Id.
56. Id. at 70–73.
57. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 125–31, 126 nn.168–70 (Yale U. Press ed. 1997); Margaret A. Berger, The
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint
Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 594 (1992); Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the
Hearsay Rule: The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 763, 780–82 (2000); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles,
86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1015–18 (1998).
58. See AMAR, supra note 57, at 125–31, 126 nn.168–70 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. 56)
(“Though the text and purposes of the confrontation clause seem clear enough, modern Supreme
Court case law on the clause is surprisingly muddled in logic and exposition.”).
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independent substance”;59 and for introducing unnecessary inconsistency and
confusion into this area of the law.60
2. Crawford v. Washington
The Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts some twenty years later in Crawford v.
Washington.61 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the State of
Washington’s use of a tape-recorded statement obtained by police during an
interrogation of the defendant’s wife in the defendant’s trial for assault and
attempted murder violated the Confrontation Clause.62 The facts of the case are
as follows.
Michael Crawford and his wife Sylvia were involved in an altercation with
Kenneth Lee “in which Lee was stabbed in the torso and [Michael’s] hand was
cut.”63 Michael and Sylvia were arrested and separately interrogated by the
police. Their accounts of the events leading up to the assault differed as to
whether Lee had actually drawn a weapon before Michael assaulted him.64
Michael was subsequently charged with stabbing Lee and claimed self-defense.
No charges were filed against Sylvia.65
Sylvia was unavailable to testify on the grounds of a state marital privilege.
In her absence, the prosecution sought to introduce her statements to the police
in order to challenge Michael’s claims of self-defense.66 The trial court,
following Roberts, admitted the statements into evidence on the grounds that the
statements bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”67 The jury
convicted Michael of assault and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed.68
Justice Scalia began his opinion with a lengthy discussion of the history of the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and suggested that history permits
two inferences about its meaning.69 First, the Confrontation Clause was
59. Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 359 n.26 (2007) (first citing Randolph N.
Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 574–
75 (1988); and then citing David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause, the Right Against SelfIncrimination and the Supreme Court: A Critique and Some Modest Proposals, 20 DUQ. L. REV.
429, 433 (1982)).
60. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1208 (2002); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 167–68 (1995).
61. 541 U.S. 36, 67–69 (2004).
62. Id. at 40, 68–69.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 39, 41–42.
65. Id. at 40.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
68. Id. at 41–42.
69. Id. at 50.
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specifically directed at the use of ex parte examinations as evidence in criminal
proceedings against the accused, and second, the Framers would not have
allowed the admission of testimonial statements of an unavailable witness unless
the defendant was previously afforded an opportunity for cross-examination.70
He criticized Roberts on the grounds that conditioning the admissibility of
hearsay evidence on “whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’
or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’” is in conflict with the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, principally because it allows a
jury to hear evidence that can include statements, which are in fact ex parte
testimony, upon a simple judicial determination of reliability.71 He noted,
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”72
Based on this, Justice Scalia opined that the confrontation right applies to
witnesses, which he defined as “those who ‘bear testimony.’”73 He defined
testimony as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.”74 Although he refused to comprehensively
define which statements would trigger constitutional protections, he
acknowledged that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’
statements exist,” including out-of-court statements “made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.”75 He further added, “[w]hatever else
the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”76
In closing, he stated that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth

70. Id. at 53–54.
71. Id. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
72. Id. at 62. He also stated:
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again
throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar. This consideration
does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay
exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances.
Id. at 56 n.7.
73. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
74. Id. at 68 (alteration in original).
75. Id. at 51–52 (quoting Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
76. Id. at 68. There is much disagreement with Justice Scalia’s interpretation. See, e.g., David
L. Noll, Constitutional Evasion and the Confrontation Puzzle, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1905–06
(2015) (referring to the Crawford Court’s approach to the Confrontation Clause as “missteps [that]
led to the doctrinal breakdown that continues to this day”); Friedman, supra note 57, at 1025–26;
Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, supra note 44, at
86–87.
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Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”77
3. Davis v. Washington
One year after its decision in Crawford v. Washington, the Court granted
certiorari in Davis v. Washington.78 In this case, the Court further expanded the
definition of testimonial statements and introduced what is now known as the
primary purpose test. This case involved two consolidated domestic violence
cases: Davis v. Washington79 and Hammon v. Indiana.80 In Davis, Michelle
McCottry made a 911 emergency call during a domestic dispute with her
boyfriend, Adrian Davis.81 During the call she identified Davis as the
perpetrator.82 While she was speaking to the operator, Davis left the house and
drove away in his car. The police arrived approximately four minutes later,
finding McCottry in a “shaken state” with injuries on her forearm and face.83
Davis was charged with a felony violation of a no-contact order. McCottry did
not appear at trial and the trial court, over Davis’ objections, admitted the
recording of McCottry’s 911 call.84
In Hammon v. Indiana, police officers responded to a domestic disturbance
report at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.85 When they arrived, they
found Amy on the front porch alone. Although she appeared frightened, she told
them that nothing was wrong.86 When they entered the house, they found
Hershel in the kitchen. He told the officers that he and his wife had been fighting
but that “everything was fine now.”87 The officers separated Amy and Hershel
and after Amy presented her side of the story, officers had her handwrite her
statement in a “battery affidavit.”88 Herschel was charged with domestic battery.
Amy was subpoenaed but did not appear at trial. In her absence, the trial court
allowed the officers to testify as to the statements she made and granted the
prosecution’s motion to admit her affidavit into evidence.89
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority and citing Crawford, noted that
testimonial statements include “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 975 (2005).
111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 818–19.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id.

116

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:105

course of interrogations.”90 However, he excepted police interrogations that
occur in emergency situations, stating:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.91
He emphasized that the focus of the inquiry is on the declarant, stating, “it is
in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions,
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”92
In applying these rules to the cases before it, the Court found that the
statements made during the 911 call in Davis were not testimonial because the
statements described events as they were occurring and the information elicited
in response to the questions asked by the interrogator was necessary for the
police to be able to respond to the present emergency.93 By contrast, the Court
found that Amy Hammon’s statements to the police were testimonial because
her statements were made some time after the emergency had ended and
recounted only past events.94
4. Michigan v. Bryant
The Court altered the parameters of the primary purpose test it established in
Davis five years later in Michigan v. Bryant.95 The facts are as follows. In the
early morning hours of April 29, 2001, Detroit police officers responded to a
radio dispatch indicating a man had been shot.96 They found the decedent,
Anthony Covington, lying on the ground next to his car in the parking lot of a
gas station. The officers noticed he had a gunshot wound to his abdomen,
appeared to be in great pain, and was having difficulty speaking.97 He told the
police that a man named Rick had shot him about a half hour earlier as he was
90. Id. at 822 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53
(2004)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 822 n.1.
93. Id. at 827–28.
94. Id. at 831–32. Respondents for both cases argued the need for greater flexibility in the
use of hearsay testimony in cases of domestic abuse because these crimes are “notoriously
susceptible” to intimidation of the victims by their assailants to assure that they do not testify.
Although the Court expressed its sympathy to the plight of these victims, it rejected the argument,
noting: “We may not . . . vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the
guilty to go free.” Id. at 832–33.
95. 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
96. Id. at 349.
97. Id.
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leaving Rick’s house. After being shot, he fled Rick’s house in his car, driving
to the gas station where the police found him.98 The police interrogation lasted
approximately five to ten minutes and ended when emergency medical personnel
arrived at the scene. Covington was taken to a local hospital where he died a
few hours later.99 Bryant was arrested in California approximately one year later
and returned to Michigan where he was tried for murder.100
The trial court admitted the statements that Covington made to the police at
the gas station.101 Bryant was convicted of second-degree murder; however, the
Supreme Court of Michigan reversed his conviction.102 Citing Davis, the Court
found that Covington’s statements to the police were inadmissible on the
grounds that they were testimonial hearsay.103
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the
Michigan Supreme Court and remanded the case, this time with Justice
Sotomayor authoring the majority opinion.104 Returning to the primary purpose
test it set out in Davis, the Court noted that the existence of an ongoing
emergency is one of the most important indicators in determining the primary
purpose of an interrogation. This is because an ongoing emergency focuses the
individuals involved on resolving an active threat rather than “proving past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”105 The Court
explained that determining the primary purpose of an interrogation and whether
an emergency exists is a fact-dependent inquiry that depends on a variety of
factors including: the type and scope of danger to the police, victim, and public
at large; the type of weapon involved; the victim’s medical condition; and the
statements and actions of all of the individuals involved.106
98. Id.
99. Id. There is a significant discrepancy as to the actions of the police at this point in time.
The majority opinion suggests that the police immediately called for backup and traveled to
Bryant’s house. Id. However, the dissent claims that it took the police approximately two and a
half hours before they had “secured the scene of the shooting.” Id. at 388. Nonetheless, when the
police went to the defendant’s house, they found a bullet hole in the back door along with
Covington’s wallet and identification. Id. at 350.
100. Id. at 374.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Id. Although the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately reversed his conviction, the case
was previously remanded to the Michigan Court of Appeals to be reconsidered in light of the Davis
decision, which was decided after the court affirmed the conviction. Once again, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Covington’s statements to police were not
testimonial. Id.
103. Id. at 351.
104. Id. at 378.
105. Id. at 361 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
106. Id. at 363–65. The Court compared the facts in Davis to the instant case and commented
that in domestic violence cases such as Davis and Hammon, the emergency will have a shorter
duration than the one in the present case because domestic violence cases have a “narrower zone
of potential victims than cases involving threats to public safety.” Id. at 363. A victim’s medical
condition will be relevant because it “sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at
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Applying these rules to the case before it, the Court concluded that there was
an ongoing emergency at the time the police officers interrogated Covington,
noting that crimes involving guns result in a heightened state of emergency.107
In examining the statements and actions of the police officers, the Court found
that they responded to a call that a man had been shot and that their questions to
Covington focused on obtaining information about the shooting which was
necessary to allow them to “meet an ongoing emergency.”108 The Court also
noted that, in light of these facts, it could not reasonably say that “a person in
Covington’s situation would have had a ‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”109 It concluded
that the circumstances of the encounter, coupled with the statements and actions
of Covington and the police officers, demonstrated that Covington’s statements
were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the interrogation was to
enable the police to respond to an ongoing emergency.110
5. Ohio v. Clark
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision in this area of the law is Ohio v.
Clark, a 2015 decision that involved the physical abuse of a young boy and the
statements he made to a teacher in which he identified his mother’s live-in
boyfriend as his abuser.111 At the time of the incident, the defendant, Darius
Clark lived with his girlfriend, Tahiem T., her eighteen-month-old daughter,
A.T., and her three-and-a-half-year-old son, L.P.112 Tahiem had a long history
with the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services. Her

all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would
necessarily be a testimonial one.” Id. at 364–65.
107. Id. at 373–74.
108. Id. at 376 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
109. Id. at 375 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
110. Id. at 377–78. The Court, without explanation, and in dicta, reintroduced the concept of
reliability, which has been absent from its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence since its decision in
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Id. at 353. It noted that in determining the primary purpose
of an interrogation, “standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable,
will be relevant.” Id. at 358–59. Justice Scalia delivered a scathing dissent, accusing the majority
of “distor[ting] our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leav[ing] it in a shambles.” Id. at 380.
He disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of facts, stating:
Today’s tale—a story of five officers conducting successive examinations of a dying man
with the primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony regarding his
killer, but of protecting him, them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the loose—
is so transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this institution.
Id. at 379.
111. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
112. Id. at 2177.
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parental rights to three older children had been terminated due to abuse and
neglect and her drug abuse.113
Tahiem picked her son up from preschool on the afternoon of March 16, 2010.
At that time, he had no observable injuries. She was with L.P. until
approximately midnight when she left Cleveland to engage in prostitution in
Washington, D.C., leaving L.P. and A.T. in Clark’s care.114 The next day, L.P.’s
preschool teachers noticed he had certain injuries, principally that one of his one
eyes appeared bloodshot. They also observed red marks on his face. When he
was asked what happened to him, he initially said nothing; later, he said he
fell.115 He finally named Clark but only after prolonged questioning.116
The school contacted the Department of Child and Family Services, which
then sent a social worker to the school to question L.P. At first, L.P. told the
worker that he had fallen. However, after further questioning, L.P. indicated
that “the bruises came from [Clark].”117 Clark arrived at the school while the
social worker was questioning L.P.118 He denied responsibility for L.P.’s
injuries and abruptly left with L.P.119 The next day a social worker found A.T.
and L.P. at Clark’s mother’s house, under the care of teenagers.120 After
observing injuries to both young children, she took them to the hospital where
the doctors found multiple injuries to both children.121
Clark was arrested and charged with numerous counts of felonious assault and
child endangerment.122 The central issue at trial was whether Clark or Tahiem
113. Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (noting there was also evidence that she continued to physically
abuse her two younger children).
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 9–10. Another teacher pulled him aside asking: “Who did this? What happened to
you? [D]id [you] get a spanking?” Id. at 11 (alteration in original).
116. In describing his response to the questioning, the teacher commented that she thought he
appeared “bewildered.” When asked what she meant by “bewildered,” she elaborated: “Out.
Staring out. And I was asking him—he almost looked uncertain, but he said, ‘Dee.’” Joint
Appendix at 61, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352), 2014 WL 6468981
[hereinafter Joint Appendix]. On cross-examination, the teacher acknowledged that she was not
sure whether L.P. understood what was being asked of him. Id. at 82.
117. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 12.
118. Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 147.
119. The social worker testified that Clark left abruptly, before the worker could finish his
questioning. Although he attempted to stop Clark from leaving, the confrontation ended at a “staredown” between Clark and himself because he “didn’t want to get into a physical altercation.” Id.
at 150–51.
120. Id. at 99–100.
121. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 12–13. When a social worker contacted Tahiem
by phone to relay her concerns about the children, Tahiem accused the teachers of lying. She also
told the worker that she was with the children and “was about to take L.P. for treatment for pink
eye”—even though she was in Washington at the time. Id. at 12. After being told about the
physician’s findings and L.P.’s allegations, Tahiem decided to remain in Washington. In fact, not
until her extradition five months later did she return to Ohio. Id. at 14.
122. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2178 (2015).
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caused the children’s injuries.123 Over defense counsel’s objections, the court
allowed the teachers to testify to the statements L.P. made to them as evidence
of Clark’s guilt.124 In closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly told the jury
to focus on L.P.’s hearsay statements in determining Clark’s guilt.125 Clark was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison. The Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal of the court of appeals, finding that L.P.’s statements
were testimonial in nature.126
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court. Justice Alito, writing for the Court, found that L.P.’s
statements were not testimonial because they were made during an ongoing
emergency—one in which a young child was found to be a victim of physical
abuse.127 He noted that the teachers needed to determine how L.P. incurred his
injuries and the identity of the abuser. He compared the situation to the 911 call
in Davis and the situation in Bryant, commenting that “the emergency in this
case was ongoing, and the circumstances were not entirely clear.”128 He also
distinguished the present circumstances from those in Hammon, because in that
case “the police knew the identity of the assailant and questioned the victim after
shielding her from potential harm.”129
The majority adopted the rationale of many of the lower courts that found a
young child’s statements could not be testimonial in nature because a young
child would be incapable of understanding that his or her statements could be
used as a substitute for live testimony at trial.130 The Court rejected defendant’s
123. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 15.
124. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178. The court found L.P. was not competent to testify. At a
competency hearing, which was held before Clark’s trial, L.P., four years old by that time, was
unresponsive to questioning. He was unable to state his age, where he went to school, his birthday,
his sister’s age, or who he lived with. As a result, the court found him incompetent to testify. For
a transcript of L.P.’s competency hearing, see Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 4–12.
125. Brief for Respondent, supra note 113, at 15.
126. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2178. Applying the primary purpose test, the court found L.P.’s
statements to the teachers to be testimonial because the teachers were acting pursuant to their duty
to investigate and report suspected child abuse. State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Ohio 2013).
The court found no ongoing emergency at the time L.P. was questioned because he did not complain
of his injuries and did not need emergency medical care. It noted:
Thus, the primary purpose of that inquiry was not to extricate the child from an
emergency situation or to obtain urgently needed medical attention, but rather was an
information-seeking process to determine what had occurred in the past and who had
perpetrated the abuse, establishing past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
Id.
127. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181–83.
128. Id. at 2181.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2182 (“On the contrary, a young child in these circumstances would simply want
the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have no discernable purpose at
all.”); see also Paruch, supra note 2, at 121 (identifying cases in which courts have adopted this
approach).

2018]

The Right of Confrontation in the U.S., Canada, and Europe

121

argument that L.P.’s statements were testimonial because the teachers, who were
obligated to investigate and report suspected cases of abuse under Ohio’s
mandatory reporting laws, were functioning as an arm of the police.131 Rather,
it stated, “mandatory reporting statutes alone cannot convert a conversation
between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission . .
. .”132
6. Commentary on U.S. Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s Crawford jurisprudence has come under significant
criticism in recent years. Scholars are critical of Justice Scalia’s interpretation
of the history of the Confrontation Clause and the theoretical underpinning for
the testimonial approach he set out in Crawford.133 Professor Thomas Davies

131. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182–83.
132. Id. at 2183. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, criticized Alito for his
reintroduction of the Ohio v. Roberts’ “indicia of reliability” test overruled by Crawford, referring
to it as “that flabbly test” loved by prosecutors, past and present. Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment). There is another line of Confrontation Clause cases dealing with laboratory
reports that have been omitted from this discussion. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 308–10 (2009) (holding that laboratory analysts’ certificates indicating a substance seized
from the defendant was cocaine were testimonial); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664–
65 (2011) (holding that an analysts’ report containing defendant’s blood alcohol level was
testimonial); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56 (2012) (plurality opinion) (dealing with reports
containing DNA analyses). At the time it was issued, Williams appeared to end any doctrinal
stability among the members of the Court. The concurring justices disagreed over whether a
particular laboratory report was hearsay since it had not been admitted into evidence. They also
disagreed as to whether the report itself was a testimonial statement since the analysts that prepared
the report were not aware of how it would be used. See Williams, 567 U.S. at 87–93 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 103–18 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Four justices dissented, finding
that the Court’s prior holdings in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming controlled. Id. at 134–40 (Kagan,
J., dissenting). As a result of these divergent opinions, there was no rule of law from Williams.
133. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or
Are They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2011) (“Justice
Scalia—who allows for departures from the original understanding on the basis of precedent,
justiciability, and settled historical practice—is not really an originalist at all.” (citing Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13
(2006))); see also Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 200–04
(2005) (“What is most impressive about Crawford is how its skillful blend of originalism and
formalism persuaded seven members of the Court to throw out decades of precedent.”). Many
discussions of the history of the Confrontation Clause begin by noting that history provides scant
guidance in interpreting it. Justice Harlan concurring in California v. Green noted:
As the Court’s opinion suggests, the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded
parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
....
From the scant information available[,] it may tentatively b[e] concluded that the
Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses,
trials by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses.
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argues that Crawford’s claim that the right of confrontation at the time of the
framing was limited to testimonial hearsay is wrong.134 He contends that neither
the text of the Sixth Amendment nor its historical meaning compel Crawford’s
testimonial rule.135 He rests his opinion on the fact that during the framing era,
out-of-court statements, including the type contained in 911 calls, criminal
investigation reports, and forensic tests, were not admitted as evidence in
criminal trials.136
Professor Mike Madden disagrees with Crawford’s interpretation of the
historical facts and text of the Confrontation Clause.137 He argues that the
majority could have reasonably concluded that no right to cross-examine
witnesses is protected by the Sixth Amendment. Pointing to the ambiguity
surrounding the term “witnesses” within the Confrontation Clause as an
example, he highlights Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that the phrase
“witnesses against” could be read to apply to “those who actually testify at trial,
those whose statements are offered at trial, or something in-between.”138
Scholars have also criticized the Court’s primary purpose test and its focus on
the “ongoing emergency” situation. They argue that it is unrealistic to require
that a court determine a singular reason for the statements or the interrogation
because the same statements that are used to help resolve an ongoing emergency
can later be used to convict a defendant at trial.139 Professor Jeffrey Fisher has
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173–74, 179 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey
Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1881 (2012)
(disagreeing with the Court’s approach as a matter of textual and historical analysis).
134. Davies, supra note 59, at 351–52; see also David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 53–54 (“What matters fundamentally is what the Confrontation Clause
meant to the people who framed and adopted it.”).
135. Davies, supra note 59, at 369–71.
136. Id. at 366–67. Professor Davies demonstrates through a review of the legal sources at the
time of the framing that only sworn or functionally sworn statements made by unavailable witnesses
could be admitted in a criminal trial as evidence of defendant’s guilt. Id. at 383. He notes that the
only exceptions to this rule were the use of prior out-of-court statements that could be used to
corroborate or impeach a witness’s trial testimony, and the use of hearsay to establish background
facts that did not establish defendant’s guilt, such as proving the existence of a conspiracy. Id. at
462. The author also reviewed pre-framing treatises and manuals and found that they identified
two kinds of out-of-court statements that were admitted in criminal trials as evidence of defendant’s
guilt—a sworn Marian examination of an unavailable witness and a dying declaration of a murder
victim. Id. at 387, 391. These conclusions are supported by Chief Justice Marshall’s 1807 ruling
on the inadmissibility of informal, out-of-court statements in United States v. Burr, in which he
remarked, “I know not why . . . a man should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his absence, may be evidence against
him.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
137. Mike Madden, Anchoring the Law in a Bed of Principle: A Critique of, and Proposal to
Improve, Canadian and American Hearsay and Confrontation Law, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 395, 411–12 (2012).
138. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004)).
139. See, e.g., Joëlle Anne Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause
Legacy from its (Glorious) Beginning to (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1215–17 (2011)
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questioned how a state of emergency, standing alone, can make a person’s
statements to law enforcement nontestimonial.140 He stated:
The lesson of the failed Roberts framework is that the confrontation
right needs to be protected with doctrine that reflects confrontation
values. Courts should heed that lesson when interpreting and applying
the Davis decision. Assessing simply whether an “emergency” existed
while a person described potentially criminal events does not
meaningfully help determine whether introducing the person’s
statement in a criminal trial would make the person a “witness” against
the defendant. Nor does examining any questioner’s primary purpose
in eliciting such an out-of-court statement materially assist in that
inquiry.141
The Court has also been criticized for its expansive reading of the criterion of
emergency statements, under which any conceivable purpose for an interview
can be construed as non-interrogation, resulting in statements that fall outside of
the Confrontation Clause.142 One commentator has criticized the Bryant Court
for following such an approach, noting that the Court “manipulate[d] the facts
and law arbitrarily so as to achieve [these] results.”143

(referring to Justice Sotomayor’s application of Davis and Crawford in Michigan v. Bryant, 562
U.S. 344 (2011), as a “scattershot approach”). The Court’s focus on the declarant’s intentions
alongside those of the interrogator in determining if statements are testimonial has been recently
criticized by Professor David Noll. Professor Noll commented that “a test that turns on awareness”
that one’s statements could be used in a subsequent criminal trial, particularly given the liberal
definition of relevant evidence contained in the federal rules, “does not meaningfully constrain the
universe of statements subject to the Confrontation clause.” Noll, supra note 76, at 1958. He argues
that the focus should be on constitutional harm. Id. at 1966.
140. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What Is Happening—to the Confrontation
Clause, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 587, 613 (2007).
141. Id. at 626–27.
142. Id. at 609–14.
143. Madden, supra note 137, at 415–16 (analogizing Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination:
Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and “At Risk”, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 441–42
(2009)). Criticizing the majority’s decision in Bryant, Justice Scalia excoriated the majority’s
impact on confrontation clause jurisprudence as “leav[ing] it in a shambles.” Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 380 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In short, the Court’s post-Crawford jurisprudence has been described as a
“train wreck,”144 a “debacle,”145 a “mess,”146 and as “highly subjective, factintensive, [and] malleable.”147 Professor David Noll commented, “[o]ne of the
most notable developments in contemporary constitutional law is the breakdown
of jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v.
Washington.”148
These weaknesses and flaws are readily apparent in the Clark opinion.149 The
Court’s fact-intensive primary purpose test and the corresponding ongoingemergency concept provide an avenue for courts to manipulate the facts to
achieve their desired result. In Clark, the Court ignored relevant facts and
contorted precedent in concluding that an ongoing emergency existed at the time
the teachers questioned L.P. at school.150 The fact that L.P. was at school and
separated from his alleged abuser at the time of the questioning is significant,151
144. Daniel D. Blinka, More “Bullcoming”? The Court Courts Confusion in Confrontation,
MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/author/danielblinka/page/2/, quoted in Kevin C. McMunigal, Crawford, Confrontation, and Mental States, 64
SYRACUSE L. REV. 219, 220 (2014) (“Commentators describe the Crawford line of cases as
‘incoherent,’ ‘uncertain,’ ‘unpredictable,’ ‘a train wreck,’ ‘suffering from “vagueness” and
“double-speak,”‘ and, simply put, a ‘mess.’” (footnotes omitted)).
145. George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 17
n.a1 (2014) (attributing the term to Eileen A. Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of
Children and Other Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558 (2009)).
146. Deborah Ahrens & John Mitchell, Don’t Blame Crawford or Bryant: The Confrontation
Clause Mess Is All Davis’s Fault, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 104, 105 (2012).
147. Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2011).
148. Noll, supra note 76, at 1899.
149. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015). As previously discussed, a foundational error
in the Court’s doctrine is its focus on assessing whether the statements were testimonial in nature
at the time they were made. People do not become witnesses within the context of the
Confrontation Clause at the time they make an out-of-court statement. Instead, they become
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment when they testify at a trial, hearing, or deposition, or when
their statements are introduced into evidence at a trial. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying
text. Professor Jeffrey Fisher recognized this distinction and said of the “ongoing emergency”
inquiry: “[T]he presence of an ongoing emergency is important only insofar as it indicates that a
declarant’s statement describing criminal activity can fairly be described as part of the event itself,
rather than a report or a narrative of it.” Fisher, supra note 140, at 614.
150. Justice Alito failed to define the suspected child abuse against L.P. as falling within the
context of domestic violence, and in doing so, he ignored the distinctions Justice Sotomayor set out
for domestic violence cases in Bryant. In Bryant, the Court indicated that the duration of
emergencies rested on when the threat was neutralized, adding that emergencies within the
domestic violence context “often have a narrower zone of potential victims than cases involving
threats to public safety” and exist only while there is “a continuing threat to them.” Compare Clark,
135 S. Ct. at 2181, with Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 363–64 (2011).
151. The Court supports its finding that an ongoing emergency existed by distinguishing these
facts from Hammon, stating that in that case “the police knew the identity of the assailant and
questioned the victim after shielding her from potential harm.” Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181. However,
in Clark, the teachers learned the identity of the assailant during the course of their questioning. Id.
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as are the facts that L.P.’s injuries did not compel the teachers to seek immediate
medical care, and that Clark did not pose a threat to the public at large.152 Most
importantly, the fact that L.P. left school that day in Clark’s custody refutes the
notion that an ongoing emergency existed.153
Furthermore, the primary purpose test, which requires a court to find only one
purpose for the interrogation when other equally important purposes are present,
provides a court the opportunity to choose the purpose it prefers, and thus the
outcome it desires.154 In finding that the teacher’s primary purpose was to care
for L.P.,155 the Court dismissed the fact that the teachers were mandated
reporters and, as such, knew or should have known that any statements they
elicited from L.P. could ultimately be used in a criminal prosecution.156
B. The Law in Canada
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), enacted
as part of the Constitution Act of 1982, guarantees everyone “the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”157 Additionally,
section 11(d) provides: “Any person charged with an offence has the right to be
at 2178. Once again deviating from precedent, the Clark Court failed to consider that a
conversation can “evolve into testimonial statements.” See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828
(2006). Thus, under these facts, the argument could be made that even if the questioning began as
a non-testimonial statement, once L.P. identified Clark as the assailant—who was not present at
that time—the conversation evolved into a testimonial statement. Compare Clark, 135 S. Ct. at
2181, with Bryant, 562 U.S. at 365, and Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
152. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 364–65 (“The victim’s medical state also provides important
context for first responders to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the victim,
themselves, and the public.”).
153. Although the Court acknowledged that the teachers and the social worker “were reluctant
to release L.P. into Clark’s care,” the fact that neither the teachers nor the social worker ever felt
the need to call the police after Clark’s alleged “stare-down” with the social worker and aggressive
taking of L.P. contradicts the finding that this was an ongoing emergency. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at
2181 n.2.
154. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
155. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181 (“There is no indication that the primary purpose of the
conversation was to gather evidence for Clark’s prosecution. On the contrary, it is clear that the
first objective was to protect L.P.”).
156. Although the Court mentioned the concept of reliability, it failed to adequately assess
whether the L.P.’s statements were reliable, even though there were serious questions regarding the
reliability of his statements for a variety of reasons. L.P.’s statements were ambiguous and he gave
several different reasons for his injuries during the course of the repeated questioning. Id. at 2178.
At the trial, one of the teachers acknowledged that she was not sure he understood what he was
being asked. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. At the competency hearing held before
the trial, he was unable to answer simple questions such as who his sister was, when his birthday
was, where he went to school, or even whom he lived with. It was these responses that caused the
judge to remark only a few minutes into the questioning, “I’ve heard enough,” and declare him
incompetent to testify. Joint Appendix, supra note 116, at 4–12.
157. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
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presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal[.]”158
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has stated that the right to a fair trial is
the proper end to be achieved under section 7 and is one of the foundational
principles of fundamental justice.159 However, unlike the Sixth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, the Charter does not enumerate the right of confrontation.
In fact, the SCC has recognized that the rights provided under section 7 do not
include the right to confront or cross-examine witnesses.160 However, it has
found that the right of an accused to make a full answer and defense to the
charges against him is implied under section 7.161 It explained:
The right to make full answer and defen[s]e manifests itself in several
more specific rights and principles, such as the right to full and timely
disclosure, . . . as well as various rights of cross-examination, among
others. The right is integrally linked to other principles of fundamental
justice, such as the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial,
and the principle against self-incrimination.162
The SCC has also found that the principle of fundamental justice contained in
section 7 encompasses not only individual rights but societal interests as well.163
In R. v. Jarvis,164 for example, the SCC recognized the societal interest in the
truth-seeking process.165 It elevated this societal interest to constitutional status
by stating that the “principle of fundamental justice suggest[s] that relevant
evidence should be available to the trier of fact in a search for truth.”166
The SCC revolutionized the common law of evidence during the period of
time that coincided with enactment of the Charter.167 This revolution has

158. Id. § 11(d).
159. R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 47 (Can.). The SCC has also
noted that the rights set forth in sections 8 through 14 of the Charter are “examples of the principles
of fundamental justice” that are referenced in section 7. Madden, supra note 137, at 418–19 (citing
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 603).
160. Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, para. 48.
161. R. v. Rose, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, para. 98 (Can.).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., DAVID M. PACIOCCO & LEE STUESSER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4 (5th ed. 2008)
(Can.).
164. R. v. Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 (Can.).
165. See PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 4 (citing Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, para.
68).
166. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, para. 68.
167. See Hamish Stewart, Section 7 of the Charter and the Common Law Rules of Evidence,
in 40 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW 415 (2d series, 2008) (Can.) (noting that the Charter became
effective in April 1982, whereas the SCC’s evidence revolution began the next month with its
decision in R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 (Can.) (eliminating the corroboration requirement
for accomplice testimony)). It has been argued that this flexible approach is actually more in line
with the Charter because it affords increased protections to defendants. Some scholars maintain
that a strict interpretation of the rules of evidence would lead, in some circumstances, to the
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brought significant changes to the Canadian law of evidence, the result of which
has been a trend toward a more flexible approach to the admission of evidence
at trial, replacing the traditional rigid approach under which the rules were
strictly interpreted.168 The adoption of the flexible approach, which has come to
be known as the “principled approach,” was motivated in part by the perceived
need to improve the law as it related to the prosecution of sexual crimes.169 It
was widely believed that a rigid interpretation of the rules resulted in the
exclusion of valuable evidence and the acquittal of “clearly guilty” persons.170
Significant changes in the law of evidence and criminal procedure were enacted
in response to this perceived need, including the removal of corroboration
requirements in most instances, the modification of standards for the
competence of witnesses, and the relaxation of the hearsay rule.171 Professors
Paciocco and Stuesser suggest that the trend toward more liberal admissibility
rules and the adoption of the principled approach can also be attributed, in part,
to the decreasing use of juries; juries hear only a small percentage of criminal
cases in Canada and are rarely used in civil cases.172
In addition to the rationale discussed above, there was growing dissatisfaction
with the traditional rules related to the admissibility of hearsay in Canadian legal
circles, which included the courts, legal scholars, law reform commissions, and
the Federal/Provincial Task Force on the Law of Evidence.173 Despite this,
proposed parliamentary reform in the 1980s failed.174 However, the SCC did
not sit idly by, and in the early 1990s issued two decisions, R. v. Khan175 and R.
v. Smith,176 which radically changed the approach that Canadian courts would
take to determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence.177

exclusion of exculpatory evidence and to the admission of evidence that operates unfairly against
defendants. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5.
168. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5; see also Peter Sankoff, Rewriting the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Four Suggestions Designed to Promote a Fairer Trial
and Evidentiary Process, in 40 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW 369 (2d series, 2008) (Can.)
(commenting that “none of the Charter rights specifically target evidentiary concerns, and the
absence of such a provision has prevented the Charter from having a major effect in this area”).
169. See PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5; see also Archibald, supra note 4, at 5.
170. Archibald, supra note 4, at 10.
171. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 5.
172. Id. at 5–7.
173. Archibald, supra note 4, at 2–4.
174. Id. at 4. The attempt to reform the law of evidence came in the form of Bill S-33, entitled
An Act to give effect, for Canada, to the Uniform Evidence Act adopted by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada. Id. at 4 n.8.
175. R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (Can.).
176. R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (Can.).
177. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 4, n.9.
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1. R. v. Khan and R. v. Smith
In R. v. Khan, a physician was on trial for sexually assaulting a three-year-old
girl during a routine office visit.178 Shortly after leaving his office
(approximately thirty minutes after the alleged assault), the child described the
events to her mother. The mother reported the assault to the police and the
defendant was arrested and charged with sexual assault.179 The trial judge found
that the child was not competent to testify and denied the prosecutor’s request
to admit the child’s statements.180 Applying the common law rules of evidence,
the court found the girl’s statements to her mother were inadmissible because
they were not contemporaneous with the event. The defendant was found not
guilty.181
The SCC agreed with the trial court’s ruling regarding the contemporaneous
nature of the girl’s statements.182 However, Madam Justice McLachlin, writing
for the court, stressed the need for increased flexibility in interpreting hearsay
rules in cases involving sexual abuse of young children.183 She identified the
two foundational principles of the law of evidence: necessity and reliability.184
Incorporating these two principles, the SCC held that hearsay statements would
be admissible provided the evidence is “reasonably necessary” and reliable.185
The SCC set forth its new rule regarding children’s statements:
[H]earsay evidence of a child’s statement on crimes committed against
the child should be received, provided that the guarantees of necessity
and reliability are met, subject to such safeguards as the judge may
consider necessary and subject always to considerations affecting the
weight that should be accorded to such evidence.186
The SCC refused to provide a list of factors for courts to consider in
determining if the evidence was reliable, explaining that the determination of
reliability varies and should be left to the discretion of the trial judge.187
However, the SCC noted that “considerations such as timing, demeanour, the
personality of the child, the intelligence and understanding of the child, and the
absence of any reason to expect fabrication in the statement” may be important
in determining reliability.188

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 533–34.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542–44.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 547.
Id.
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The SCC held that the mother’s statements should have been admitted because
both the necessity and reliability requirements were met. It found the statements
were necessary because the child was found not competent to testify; they were
reliable because the child had no reason to fabricate her story and because she
made the statement “naturally and without prompting.”189 Furthermore, the SCC
found the statements were reliable because a child of her age would ordinarily
not possess knowledge of these types of sexual acts, and her statements were
corroborated by physical evidence.190
Two years later, the SCC decided R. v. Smith, a case involving statements
made by a murder victim to her mother shortly before her murder.191 The SCC
ruled that the principles that it previously set out in Khan were to be applied in
all cases and not limited to cases of child abuse.192 It stated, “Hearsay evidence
is now admissible on a principled basis, the governing principles being the
reliability of the evidence, and its necessity.”193
2. R. v. Starr
The SCC continued to develop the principled approach it established in Khan
and Smith nearly a decade later in R. v. Starr.194 In Starr, the defendant was
charged with two counts of first-degree murder following the shooting deaths of
two victims.195 A key piece of evidence against the defendant was one of the
victim’s statements to his girlfriend in which he stated that he was going to “go
and do an Autopac scam with [the defendant].”196 The trial judge admitted the
statement under the “present intentions” exception to the hearsay rule as proof
that the victim and the defendant were together at the time of the killing.197
The SCC vacated the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial.198
Noting the relationship between the principled approach and traditional hearsay
exceptions, it held that in cases where the traditional exceptions are at odds with
the principled approach, the traditional exceptions must be revised in light of the

189. Id. at 548.
190. Id.
191. R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (Can.).
192. Id. at 932 (“Khan should not be understood as turning on its particular facts, but, instead,
must be seen as a particular expression of the fundamental principles that underlie the hearsay rule
and the exceptions to it.”).
193. Id. at 933. It provided guidance for courts in determining these required criteria.
Reliability or “the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness [] is a function of the circumstances
under which the statement in question was made.” Necessity, on the other hand, “refers to the
necessity of the hearsay evidence to prove a fact in issue.” The SCC also noted that necessity
should be given a flexible definition “capable of encompassing diverse situations.” Id. at 933–34.
194. R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 (Can.).
195. Id. at 205, para. 103.
196. Id. at 208, para. 111.
197. Id. at 215, para. 132.
198. Id. at 269, para. 245.
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principled approach.199 In other words, the principled approach governs the
admission of hearsay evidence; thus, a hearsay statement that satisfies a
traditional hearsay exception is no longer automatically admissible.200 It stated:
In Khan, Smith, and subsequent cases, this Court allowed the
admission of hearsay not fitting within an established exception where
it was sufficiently reliable and necessary to address the traditional
hearsay dangers. However, this concern for reliability and necessity
should be no less present when the hearsay is sought to be introduced
under an established exception. This is particularly true in the criminal
context given the “fundamental principle of justice, protected by the
Charter, that the innocent must not be convicted.” It would
compromise trial fairness, and raise the spectre of wrongful
convictions, if the Crown is allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay
against the accused, regardless of whether it happens to fall within an
existing exception.201
After determining that the challenged statement was in fact hearsay,202 the
SCC found that the victim had a reason to lie to his girlfriend about his intentions
at the time he made the statement.203 In finding that the statement was made
under “circumstances of suspicion,” the SCC held that the statement did “not
fall within the present intentions exception.”204 Therefore, in analyzing the
statement under the principled approach, the “circumstances of suspicion” that
surrounded the making of the statement rendered it unreliable. The SCC added,
“Having found that the statement is unreliable, it is unnecessary to go on to ask
whether it was necessary or not.”205 Accordingly, the SCC concluded that the
199. Id. at 250, para. 207 (“The more appropriate approach is to seek to derive the benefits of
certainty, efficiency, and guidance that the [traditional hearsay] exceptions offer, while adding the
benefits of fairness and logic that the principled approach provides.”).
200. Id. at 243, para. 192 (“[T]o the extent that the various exceptions may conflict with the
requirements of a principled analysis, it is the principled analysis that should prevail.”).
Hearsay evidence may only be admitted if it is necessary and reliable, and the traditional
exceptions should be interpreted in a manner consistent with this requirement.
In some rare cases, it may also be possible under the particular circumstances of a case
for evidence clearly falling within an otherwise valid exception nonetheless not to meet
the principled approach’s requirements of necessity and reliability. In such a case, the
evidence would be excluded.
Id. at 253, paras. 213–14.
201. Id. at 247, para. 200 (quoting R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, para. 71 (Can.)).
202. Id. at 231, para. 167 (“It was an out-of-court statement, and it was offered by the Crown
to prove the truth of the matter asserted; namely, that [the victim] intended to do an Autopac scam
with [the defendant].”).
203. Id. at 237, para. 179 (“[The victim] may have had a motive to lie in order to make it seem
that he was not romantically involved with [another woman], and . . . could point to the [defendant],
who was sitting nearby in a car but out of earshot, as being the person with whom he was going to
do a scam.”).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 251, para. 209.
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statement should not have been admitted because it was “inadmissible under the
principled approach” and “[did] not fall under an existing exception either.”206
3. R. v. Khelawon
The SCC set out the procedure that courts should follow under the principled
approach in its 2006 decision in R. v. Khelawon.207 This case involved
statements made by Skupien, an elderly resident of a nursing home, to a
caregiver,208 his physician,209 and ultimately in a videotaped interview with the
police in which he reported that the defendant, the manager of a nursing home,
had physically assaulted him.210 In the course of their investigation, the police
interviewed several other residents of the home who also reported that the
defendant had assaulted them.211 The defendant was convicted of assault
following a trial in which Skupien’s hearsay statements, along with those of the
other residents of the home, were admitted.212 The trial judge found the hearsay
statements were reliable because of the “striking similarity” between Skupien’s
statements and those of the other residents.213
The SCC noted that the rationale for the use of the principled approach in
criminal cases arises from section 7 of the Charter.214 It commented that
although the adversary system is based on the assumption that the
untrustworthiness of a witness’s statements is best brought to light through
cross-examination, alongside the defendant’s right to make a full answer and
defense is society’s interest in having a trial process that is designed to discover
the truth.215 It engaged in a lengthy discussion of the hearsay rule and the
challenges presented when attempting to determine the reliability of these types
of statements in the absence of cross-examination.216 It preceded this discussion
by setting out the then-current, governing framework:

206. Id.
207. R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (Can.).
208. Id. at 797–98, paras. 11–13.
209. Id. at 799, para. 15.
210. Id. at 799, para. 16.
211. Id. at 800, para. 18.
212. Id. at 804, para. 28 (“At the conclusion of the trial, [the judge] ultimately found only two
of the videotaped statements sufficiently credible to found a conviction . . . .”).
213. Id. at 804, para. 26.
214. Id. at 814, para. 47. The Court stated:
The concern over trial fairness is one of the paramount reasons for rationalizing the
traditional hearsay exceptions in accordance with the principled approach. As stated [in
Starr] in respect of Crown evidence: “It would compromise trial fairness, and raise the
spectre of wrongful convictions, if the Crown is allowed to introduce unreliable hearsay
against the accused, regardless of whether it happens to fall within an existing exception.”
Id. at 814, para. 47 (quoting R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, para. 200).
215. Id. at 814–15, para. 48.
216. Id. at 816–18, paras. 50–55.
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(a) Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless it falls
under an exception to the hearsay rule. The traditional exceptions to
the hearsay rule remain presumptively in place.
(b) A hearsay exception can be challenged to determine whether it is
supported by indicia of necessity and reliability, required by the
principled approach. The exception can be modified as necessary to
bring it into compliance.
(c) In “rare cases,” evidence falling within an existing exception may
be excluded because the indicia of necessity and reliability are lacking
in the particular circumstances of the case.
(d) If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay exception, it may
still be admitted if indicia of reliability and necessity are established
on a voir dire.217
The SCC next set out the procedures that courts should follow. The trial
judge, acting as the gatekeeper, must determine whether the principles of
necessity and reliability have been established based on a balance of
probabilities.218 It emphasized that it refused to create new categorical rules with
regard to reliability, preferring that the principled approach be applied on a caseby-case basis.219 Finally, it opined that the dangers raised by hearsay evidence
can be overcome if one of two broad conditions are met: (1) the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement provide evidence of the reliability of
the statement or tend to show that the statement is true; or (2) “adequate
substitutes for testing the evidence” exist.220
Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the SCC found little evidence to
demonstrate that the statements were reliable.221 It noted that an appropriate
exclusionary test asks whether “the evidence was unlikely to change under
cross-examination,” and found that the test was not met because the

217. Id. at 811–12, para. 42 (quoting R. v. Mapara, 2005 SCC 23, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358, para.
15).
218. Id. at 814, para. 47. The SCC noted the distinction between “threshold reliability” and
“ultimate reliability.” Id. at 816, para. 50. Threshold reliability is concerned with whether the
statement provides “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and is determined by the court,
whereas ultimate reliability involves the question of whether or not the statement will be relied
upon in deciding the issues involved in the case and is a matter for the fact finder to determine. Id.
at 816–17, paras. 51–52 (quoting Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at paras. 215, 217).
219. Id. 813, para. 45.
220. Id. at 823, para. 66. This factor has been found to be present in cases involving prior
statements that witnesses made to police officers or at preliminary hearings when the declarants
testified and were subject to cross examination at the trial. See, e.g., R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1
S.C.R. 740 (Can.) (involving prior inconsistent statements); R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043,
para. 76 (Can.) (finding that testimony given at a preliminary hearing, under oath, and subject to
cross-examination satisfied the test for threshold reliability).
221. Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at 842, para. 105–07 (“In order to meet the reliability
requirement in this case, the Crown could only rely on the inherent trustworthiness of the statement.
In my respectful view, there was no case to be made on that basis either.”).
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circumstances surrounding Skupien’s statements raised serious concerns. The
declarant was old and frail, his medical records were replete with diagnoses of
paranoia and dementia, and there was evidence in the medical records that his
injuries could have been caused by a fall.222 Finally, the SCC indicated that
although the existence of “striking similarities” between the statements of the
witnesses could support a finding of reliability, the facts did not support this
finding in the present case.223
Moreover, the SCC did not find there was a sufficient substitute basis for
testing Skupien’s statements because he died before the trial and was never
cross-examined at any other hearing.224 It noted that there was nothing more
than a police video of his interview stating, “[t]he principled exception to the
hearsay rule does not provide a vehicle for founding a conviction on the basis of
a police statement, videotaped or otherwise, without more.”225
4. Commentary on Canadian Jurisprudence
Many view the principled approach as a major advancement in the Canadian
law of evidence.226 Those who approve of this approach believe that the changes
better serve the public interest because the approach results in “a greater reliance
on the application of discretion at the expense of fixed rules, and more evidence
being provided to the jury for consideration.”227 Supporters of the principled
approach also cite its preference for flexible principles that require that evidence
doctrines be framed and applied in a manner focused on the interests and values
at stake in the specific evidence question.228 Professor Lisa Dufraimont has
opined that the approach’s “consistent focus on the rationales behind the rules”
has worked to assure that admissibility decisions are “more likely to further the
law’s underlying policies.”229
Although the principled approach has its supporters, it has also been criticized
on a number of fronts. First, although it was the “twin defects in the common
law of evidence,” complexity and rigidity, that drove the revolution in Canadian

222. Id. at 842–43, para. 107.
223. Id. at 844, para. 108.
224. Id. at 842, para. 106.
225. Id. at 842, para. 106.
226. See, e.g., Lisa Dufraimont, Realizing the Potential of the Principled Approach to
Evidence, 39 QUEEN’S L.J. 11, 38 (2013) (Can.).
227. Sankoff, supra note 168, at 370 (“The move to a principled approach swept away
outmoded concepts of proof that had become ‘preposterously rigid’ and simultaneously forced a
reconsideration of the governing tenets of admissibility.” (footnotes omitted)).
228. Id. at 369–70. The author commented that flexibility and judicial discretion are the
norm—describing the principled approach as “the triumph of a principled analysis over a set of
ossified judicially created categories.” Id. at 369 n.96 (quoting R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915,
930 (Can.)).
229. Dufraimont, supra note 226, at 38.
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law,230 only rigidity has been reduced entirely under the principled approach.231
Initial expectations that the principled approach would address the complexity
issue have not been fulfilled. In fact, some evidence doctrines, particularly the
hearsay rules, have grown in complexity. Under the principled approach,
hearsay may be admitted under an existing exception to the rule or on a case-bycase basis upon a finding of necessity and reliability.232
Since the adoption of the principled approach, the SCC has focused most of
its attention on the reliability factor.233 The main emphasis in its reliability
discourse has been on the circumstances surrounding the making of the out-ofcourt statement.234 Although there are some prevailing factors,235 overall
reliability remains a vague principle. The factors that courts consider are
numerous and undefined, causing one scholar to comment: “[T]he legal
mechanisms for admitting hearsay are sometimes clumsy, sometimes too
restrictive, and at other times not restrictive enough. Consequently, we have a
mess.”236 Likewise, Professor Bruce Archibald noted, “[t]he most significant
controversy . . . over the reliability issue concerns corroboration of hearsay by
230. Id. at 14. The author suggests that Canadian common law hearsay rules developed ad hoc
in response to “perceived problems in the process of proof.” Id. at 18. As a result, over time, these
“rules and exceptions multiplied and their technical requirements proliferated.” Id.; see also
MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 11 (Yale U. Press ed. 1997) (“[The disheveled state
of evidence law] is primarily attributable to the fact that common law evidentiary doctrine evolved
ad hoc, cobbled up over time from judicial rulings in individual cases.”).
231. Dufraimont, supra note 226, at 38.
232. Id. at 23, 38 (“In other areas, most importantly the traditional exceptions to the hearsay
rule, the courts have used the additive method of piling principles atop a complex set of rules.”).
233. See, e.g., R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, paras. 61–63 (Can.). Judge
Charron, writing in Khelawon, explained that “[s]ince the central underlying concern is the inability
to test hearsay evidence, it follows that under the principled approach the reliability requirement is
aimed at identifying those cases where this difficulty is sufficiently overcome to justify receiving
the evidence as an exception to the general exclusionary rule.” Id. at 820, para. 61.
234. Archibald, supra note 4, at 33–34.
235. Among the circumstances cited by Canadian courts as an indication of reliability, the
absence of a motive on the part of the declarant to lie is prominent. Id. at 34. The factors that have
come to be identified as those relevant to the determination of reliability as set out by the Khelawon
Court are:
i. the timing of the statement in relation to the event reported;
ii. the absence of a motive to lie on the part of the declarant;
iii. the presence or absence of leading questions or other forms of prompting;
iv. the nature of the event reported;
v. the likelihood of the declarant’s knowledge of the event, apart from its occurrence;
and
vi. confirmation of the event reported by physical evidence.
R. v. J.M., 2010 CanLII 117 (Can. Ont. C.A.) 117, para. 54 (citing Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. at
para. 67).
236. Timothy E. Moore, Distinguishing Reliability from Credibility: Children’s Hearsay
Evidence in Canada, Address at the Society for Research in Child Development Biennial Meeting
(Apr. 20, 2001), in Alan D. Gold Collection of Criminal Law Articles, ADGN/RP-113 (QL), para.
3 (Can.).
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evidence other than that found in the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement.”237 He criticizes the use of corroborating evidence to determine
the reliability of the hearsay statements on grounds that, when the admission of
hearsay evidence is sought, “each statement [should be] assessed for reliability
in relation to hearsay dangers.”238 He argues that using corroborating evidence
to determine the reliability of a hearsay statement is misplaced because “the
further afield one goes in seeking reliability in corroborative evidence, the
greater the dangers of a kind of ‘bootstrap’ approach, turning the principled
exception into an inclusionary rule.”239 The principled approach has also been
criticized because of its clear potential to increase indeterminacy.240 Professors
David Paciocco and Lee Stuesser have noted:
The movement to make the rules responsive to the needs of the
particular case has not come without a cost. Flexibility is being
achieved at the expense of certainty. The rules of evidence have never
been easy to apply. Yet many of those rules of evidence now require
more detailed evaluation and produce less predictable results than ever
before.
. . . . [A]ppellate courts sometimes try to elaborate on the vague
formulae that have been adopted. In the process, they provide more
particularized criteria. The precedential value in these decisions is
slowly giving structure to the broad standards of admissibility that
have been developed. Some of the open-textured rules are beginning
to operate much like the more rigid rules that they were designed to
replace.241
Ironically, the principled approach has been criticized as being unprincipled,
due to what Professor Mike Madden sees as flawed reasoning supporting the
required threshold reliability assessment.242 He criticizes the principled
approach because it allows the admission of hearsay based solely on a trial
judge’s determination of reliability without the benefit of testing the reliability
of the evidence by cross-examination.243 Madden equates this approach with the

237. Archibald, supra note 4, at 36.
238. Id. at 38.
239. Id.
240. Professor Dufraimont notes, “[s]ince the principled approach to evidence moves the law
away from rigid rules that command specific outcomes toward broad principles that allow flexible,
contextual application, it clearly carries the potential to increase indeterminacy.” Dufraimont,
supra note 226, at 17.
241. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 6.
242. Madden, supra note 137, at 429–30.
243. Professor Madden also notes that although the SCC stresses the importance of crossexamination as the best means of assessing the truth, it also suggests that there are other equally
effective means to test the reliability of the evidence. He argues that this reasoning is disjointed
since “cross-examination cannot logically and simultaneously be both ‘the best’ and ‘not the best’
means for testing evidence.” Id. at 433. He criticizes the SCC’s reasoning in Khan, in which it
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flawed reasoning in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts, which
was acknowledged by Justice Scalia in Crawford: “Dispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”244
The principled approach has also been criticized because of what many view
as its effect on the Charter’s guarantees of the right to a fair trial. Professor
Timothy Moore, noting the considerable uncertainty regarding the criteria under
which reliability is to be determined, remarked:
Predictability and uniformity are valuable and important elements of
the justice system. Without them, judicial discretion is given broad
latitude, and individual cases end up being dependent on the
idiosyncrasies of specific judicial decisions. Uncertainty is not what
we want if [victim’s] needs and defendant’s rights are to be properly
protected.245
Professor Kenneth Ehrenberg argues that the principled approach, with its
movement toward judicial discretion and liberal admissibility of evidence, has
costs that reformers never recognized.246 He further argues that it “sacrifices the
promise that legal conclusions will be reached on a uniform standard of
knowledge reproducible across cases.”247 He claims that particularly in criminal
trials, this subsequently “jeopardizes the promise of justice,” because such trials
lack “uniform justificatory standards.”248
Others argue that the principled approach affects a defendant’s right to a fair
trial because a rigorous application of the hearsay rule, alongside the right to
cross examination, promotes equality among the parties in the trial process and
ensures that “prosecutorial power is kept in check by inhibiting the capacity of
the state to use its superior resources to gather remote statements for use against
a weaker accused.”249 Professor Peter Sankoff, referencing the growing body of
scholarship surrounding the causes of wrongful convictions, suggests that the
principled approach, along with what he perceives as the corresponding trend

“assumed a statement to be reliable so that it could dispense with the need to actually establish the
reliability of a statement through cross-examination.” Id. at 432.
244. Id.
245. Moore, supra note 236, para 29.
246. Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, Less Evidence, Better Knowledge, 60 MCGILL L.J. 173, 176
(2015) (Can.).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Archibald, supra note 4, at 24–25. Other critics argue that the public credibility of
verdicts in criminal cases is diminished under the principled approach because it “rests in
considerable measure on the presentation of the incriminating evidence in open court,” where the
opposing party is given a full opportunity to test the evidence through cross-examination. Id. at 24.
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toward “granting juries access to potentially prejudicial evidence[,] have been
unwilling partners in heightening the risk of wrongful convictions.”250
C. The European Court of Human Rights
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, later known as the European Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention), became effective in 1953 after being signed and ratified by eight
Western European countries.251 The Convention identifies numerous human
rights, including life, liberty, freedom of expression, and the right to marry.252
Article 6 of the Convention, entitled “[r]ight to a fair trial,” sets out the rights of
defendants in criminal trials, which include the right to be informed of the
“nature and cause of the accusations” against them and the right to free legal
assistance “when the interests of justice so require.”253 Most importantly,
Article 6(3)(d), patterned after the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
specifically sets forth a right of confrontation. It provides that a criminal
defendant has the right “to examine or have examined witnesses against him and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him.”254
The Convention also established the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) with jurisdiction over “all matters concerning the interpretation and

250. Sankoff, supra note 168, at 372. He notes that studies have demonstrated that jailhouse
informants, certain kinds of expert opinion evidence, and identification evidence, among others,
have been identified as causes of wrongful convictions. Id.
251. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), last amended by Protocol
No. 14, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. No. 194, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. Originally ratified by Denmark, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the Convention was
established by the Council of Europe; for a brief discussion on the history and organization of the
Convention, see Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of
Human Rights, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 777, 779–82 (2003). The forty-seven-member Council of
Europe, which was established in 1949, is headquartered in Strasbourg, France, and “was set up to
promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe.” Do Not Get Confused,
COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused (last visited Feb. 4,
2018). For a discussion on the history and organization of the Council of Europe, see Matthew J.
Gabel, Council of Europe, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/topic
/Council-of-Europe.
252. Section I of the Convention sets forth the “Rights and Freedoms” in articles two through
twelve and include: the “Right to life”; the “Prohibition of torture”; the “Prohibition of slavery and
forced labour”; the “Right to liberty and security”; the “Right to a fair trial”; “No punishment
without law”; the “Right to respect for private and family life”; “Freedom of thought, conscience
and religion”; “Freedom of expression”; “Freedom of assembly and association”; and the “Right to
marry.” European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 251.
253. Id. art. 6(3)(a), (c).
254. Id. art. 6(3)(d).
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application of the Convention.”255 Member countries agree to accept and
implement the decisions of the ECtHR.256
1. The Early Decisions
Although the Convention became effective in 1953, it was not until some
thirty years later, in 1986, that the ECtHR found that a criminal conviction based
on hearsay violated Article 6(3) of the Convention.257 In Unterpertinger v.
Austria, the defendant was convicted of assaulting his step-daughter and wife.258
The police interviewed the victims and set out their statements in police
reports.259 They did not testify at the trial, and in their absence, the trial court
admitted the report into evidence.260 The ECtHR found that the admission of
these reports at the defendant’s trial violated the Convention because the hearsay
statements were the main bases for his conviction, and he was not provided with
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarants.261
The ECtHR reached similar conclusions in subsequent cases.262 An important
factor it considered in determining whether the admission of hearsay rendered a
trial unfair was the probative value of the hearsay evidence weighed against

255. Id. § II.
256. Id. art. 46(1). The Court is organized into five sections, or administrative entities, and
each section has a president, a vice president, and a judicial chamber. Composition of the Court,
EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/judges (last visited Feb.
5, 2018). The Grand Chamber of the Court is composed of seventeen judges, including the
president and vice president of the court and the section presidents of each of the five sections, and
hears only a small, select number of cases each year. European Court of Human Rights, INT’L
JUST. RES. CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/european-court-of-human-rights/#Structure (last visited
Feb. 5, 2018). Cases can be referred to the Grand Chamber in one of two ways: (1) on appeal from
a Chamber decision; or (2) relinquished by a Chamber. Id.; see also Kirst, Hearsay and the Right
of Confrontation, supra note 251, at 777 (citing FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3–14 (2d ed. 1996)).
257. See Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation, supra note 251, at 782–83.
258. Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 3 (1986).
259. Id. at 3–4.
260. Id. at 6.
261. Id. at 11–12.
262. See, e.g., Barberà v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 31–32 (1989) (finding that the
admission at trial of written statements made by a person in police custody accusing the defendant
of murder violated the Convention where the witness was unavailable at trial). Other cases were
similarly decided. See Bricmont v. Belgium, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 24–26 (1989) (finding
that victims’ unsworn statements made to the court, outside of defendant’s presence, violated the
Convention). The same reasoning was applied in a line of cases involving anonymous witnesses.
In Kostovski v. Netherlands, and one year later in Windisch v. Austria, the ECtHR found that the
use of anonymous witnesses foreclosed any opportunity for the defendants to ever confront those
witnesses, either during the investigation or at any subsequent hearings, and therefore deprived the
defendants of their right to a fair trial. Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 16–
17 (1989); Windisch v. Austria, 186 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 8–9 (1990).
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other evidence produced at trial.263 Therefore, a defendant’s right to a fair trial
was not necessarily violated in cases where the conviction was based, in part, on
hearsay statements, but not “to a decisive extent.”264
In Kok v. Netherlands,265 a case involving an anonymous witness, the ECtHR
found that the admission of the declarant’s unchallenged hearsay statements did
not violate the Convention because there was “considerable alternative
evidence” of defendant’s guilt.266 Likewise, in Verdam v. Netherlands,267 the
ECtHR found that the admission of the hearsay statements of sexual assault
victims did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial because the details in
the hearsay statements were corroborated by other evidence.268
Following the ECtHR’s 2001 decision in Luca v. Italy,269 the sole or decisive
rule was treated as an absolute rule.270 In this case, the ECtHR found that the
defendant’s conviction for distributing cocaine violated the Convention where it
was based solely on hearsay statements of an individual who named the
defendant as his source of the drugs.271 It stated:
[W]here a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on
depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has

263. See, e.g., Bricmont, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25 (“It must nonetheless be determined to what
extent the Brussels Court of Appeal relied on the Prince’s [hearsay statement] in order to convict
the applicants.”).
264. See Kostovski, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17 (“The Convention does not preclude reliance, at
the investigation stage of criminal proceedings, on sources such as anonymous informants.
However, the subsequent use of anonymous statements as sufficient evidence to found a conviction
. . . is a different matter.”).
265. 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 597.
266. Id. at 623–24.
267. Verdam v. Netherlands, No. 35253/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug., 31, 1999), http://hudoc.e
chr.coe.int/eng?i=001-4748. Additionally, in Ferranteli v. Italy, a case that involved confessions
made by several of the defendant’s accomplices, the ECtHR found that the Convention was not
violated despite “the impossibility of examining or having examined before his death . . . the
prosecution’s witness,” because the appellate court “carried out a detailed analysis of the
prosecution witness’s statements and found them to be corroborated by a series of other items of
evidence.” Ferranteli v. Itay, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, §§ 44–52.
268. Verdam, No. 35253/97 at 7; see also Isgrò v. Italy, 194-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9–10
(1989) (finding the defendant’s rights were not violated, even though the witness did not appear to
testify at trial, because the defendant confronted the witness at a hearing before the investigating
judge).
269. Luca v. Italy, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167.
270. See Bas de Wilde, A Fundamental Review of the ECHR Right to Examine Witnesses in
Criminal Cases, 17 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 157, 158 (2013) (U.K.) (“[I]f the defen[s]e could not
examine a witness whose statement was the sole or decisive evidence of the charges, the ECtHR
consistently found there to have been a breach of the right to examine witnesses.”). These rules
were also applied in child sexual abuse cases. See P.S. v. Germany, No. 33900/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 20, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59996 (finding the Convention was violated
by the admission of statements an eight-year-old student made to her mother and to police officers
where the conviction was based to a decisive extent on the victim’s statements).
271. Luca, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 179.
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had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during
the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defen[s]e are restricted
to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by
Article 6.272
2. The Fourth Chamber’s Decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United
Kingdom
The Fourth Chamber’s opinion in Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom273
was one of the ECtHR’s first opportunities to review the United Kingdom’s
(U.K.) recently enacted hearsay rules as they applied in criminal cases.274 The
opinion addressed two separately filed cases that dealt with the same legal
question. In Al-Khawaja, the defendant complained that his trial for indecent
assault was unfair because the English trial court admitted the statements made
by the subsequently deceased victim to the police following the alleged
assault.275 In Tahery, the defendant claimed that his trial for “wounding with
intent to do grievous bodily harm” was tainted when the sole witness’s out-ofcourt statements were admitted at trial.276
Defendant Al-Khawaja was a rehabilitative medicine physician charged with
two counts of indecent assault on two female patients who were under hypnosis
at the time.277 One of the complainants, S.T., described the assault to the police
a few months after the incident. She died of unrelated causes before the trial,
and even though there was no other direct evidence of the assault, the trial court
allowed her statements to be admitted into evidence.278 Also admitted into
evidence were the testimonies from other witnesses to whom S.T. had reported
the assault and the testimony of the second complainant whose description of
her assault was similar to S.T.’s.279 At the close of the trial, the judge cautioned
the jury about S.T.’s statements, noting: “[Y]ou have not seen her give evidence;
you have not heard her give evidence; and you have not heard her evidence
cross-examined [by applicant’s counsel], who would undoubtedly have had a
number of questions to put to her.”280 Al-Khawaja was convicted by a
unanimous jury.281
272. Id. at 178.
273. Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, Nos. 26766/05 & 22228/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan.
20, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90781.
274. See id. at 7–8 (citing Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 116 (Eng.)) (“The following
legislative provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 were drafted as a means to tackle crime by
providing special measures to protect witnesses . . . . The Act entered into force in April 2005.”).
275. Id. at 1, § 3.
276. Id. (“[Tahery] alleged that his trial . . . had been unfair because the statement of one
witness who feared attending trial was read to the jury.”).
277. Id. at 2, § 8.
278. Id. at 2–3, §§ 8–9.
279. Id. at 3, § 10.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 3, § 12.
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Defendant Tahery was engaged in a fight in which he allegedly stabbed his
opponent three times in the back.282 The victim told police that he did not see
the person who stabbed him. Other witnesses present at the scene also denied
seeing who stabbed the victim. However, two days after the incident, one of the
witnesses came forward and told police that he saw the defendant stab the
victim.283 The witness did not appear at trial. Nonetheless, the court allowed
his statements to the police to be introduced into evidence.284
The Fourth Chamber found that the U.K. violated the Convention because the
hearsay statements in both Al-Khawaja and Tahery were the sole or decisive
basis for each conviction.285 It rejected the government’s argument that that the
sole or decisive rule was not an absolute rule.286 It also rejected the
government’s argument that there were sufficient counterbalancing factors in
both cases to overcome the prejudice to the defendants resulting from the
admission of the untested hearsay.287 The Chamber acknowledged its history of
considering whether the trial court’s use of hearsay included procedures to
counterbalance the resulting difficulties on the defense, it “doubt[ed] whether
any counterbalancing factors would be sufficient to justify the introduction in

282. Id. at 4, § 18.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 5, §§ 19–20 (“The prosecution argued that under the [Criminal Justice Act] 2003
that [the witness] was too fearful to attend trial before the jury and should qualify for special
measures [exempting him from testifying at trial].”).
285. See id. at 16–17, §§ 43, 48.
286. Id. at 13, § 37.
287. Regarding defendant Al-Khawaja, the ECtHR rejected the government’s proffered
counterbalancing factors as insufficient, which included: the fact that the trial judge gave a
cautionary warning to the jury; the fact that inconsistencies between the victim’s hearsay statement
and the testimony of corroborating witnesses could be explored on cross-examination; and the fact
that the declarant’s credibility could be challenged by the defense were sufficient to overcome the
prejudice to the defendant from admission of the statements. Id. at 15, § 41. It held: “Having
considered these factors, the Court does not find any of them, taken alone or together, could
counterbalance the prejudice to [Al-Khawaja] by admitting [the hearsay] statement.” Id. at 15–16,
§ 42. Noting that the U.K.’s appellate court had found the “judge’s warning to the jury” as
insufficient, the Chamber added, “[e]ven if it were not so, the Court is not persuaded that any more
appropriate direction could effectively counterbalance the effect of an untested statement which
was the only evidence against the applicant.” Id. In the case of defendant Tahery, the government’s
proffered counterbalancing factors included: the fact that the trial judge considered alternative
measures before admitting the hearsay; the fact that Tahery was free to challenge or rebut the
statement by testifying himself or by calling other witnesses; and that the judge told the jury that
the witness was absent from trial due to a fear of testifying not caused by Tahery. Id. at 16, § 45.
Nonetheless, the Chamber remained unpersuaded that those factors, “whether considered
individually or cumulatively, would have ensured the fairness of the proceedings or
counterbalanced the grave handicap to [Tahery] that arose from the admission of [the hearsay]
statement.” Id. at 16–17, § 46. It added that Tahery’s right to testify in his own defense “[could
not] be said to counterbalance the loss of opportunity to see and have examined and cross-examined
the only prosecution eye-witness against him.” Id.
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evidence of an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the
conviction of an applicant.”288
The newly established Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC)289
declined to follow Al-Khawaja & Tahery in R. v. Horncastle,290 which was seen
by many as a clear violation of the Convention. In declining to follow AlKhawaja & Tahery, Lord Phillips, writing for the UKSC, noted that this
presented a rare departure from the general rule that domestic courts should
“take into account” the Strasbourg jurisprudence.291 However, he stated that in
cases where a domestic court “has concerns as to whether a decision of the
Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of
our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to the domestic court to
decline to follow the Strasbourg decision . . . .”292

288. Id. at 13, § 37.
289. Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4, § 23 (U.K.). The Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom commenced work in October 2009. The Supreme Court, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/the-supreme-court (last visit
ed Feb. 15, 2018).
290. R v. Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 [108] (appeal taken from Eng.) (“In so concluding I
have taken careful account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. I hope that in due course the Strasbourg
Court may also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the sole or decisive test in
this case.”).
291. Id. [11]. The Strasbourg jurisprudence, culminating in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, holds that
Article 6 of the Convention is violated whenever a conviction is solely or decisively based on
hearsay statements admitted into evidence. Id. [7].
292. Id. [11]. This case was decided eleven months after the Fourth Chamber’s Al-Khawaja
& Tahery decision. Horncastle involved two consolidated appeals. In the first case, Horncastle
and an accomplice “were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm, with intent,” to a man named
Peter Rice. Id. [2]. Rice’s statements to the police, in which he described his attackers, were
admitted into evidence despite the fact that Rice was a registered alcoholic who admitted to drinking
a substantial quantity of alcohol on the day of the attack. R. v. Horncastle [2009] EWCA (Crim)
964 [97]. In the second case, defendants Marquis and Graham were convicted of kidnapping a
young woman named Hannah Miles. The trial court admitted Miles’ statements regarding the
alleged kidnapping—rather than compelling her to testify at trial—because the judge determined
that “she was a witness in fear.” Id. [125]–[133]. Lord Phillips, referencing the Criminal Justice
Act of 2003, explained that English law contained numerous provisions designed to ensure that
only reliable evidence would be admitted. Horncastle [2009] UKSC [36] (citing Criminal Justice
Act 2003, c. 44, §§ 124–126 (Eng.)). He argued that although pretrial confrontations between
witnesses and defendants can provide opportunities for confrontation in civil law countries, they
are not practical in common law countries where police officers, not judicial officers, conduct the
investigations. Id. [61]–[62]. He also criticized the ECtHR’s sole or decisive rule for “produc[ing]
a paradox,” in that it allows the introduction of evidence if it is peripheral, but not decisive. Id.
[91]. He further posited that courts will experience great difficulty applying the sole or decisive
rule and, as such, the only proper way to deal with this rule is to exclude all hearsay evidence. Id.
[87], [90]. This case was ultimately appealed to the Fourth Chamber of the ECtHR. Horncastle v.
United Kingdom, No. 4184/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001148673.
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3. The Grand Chamber’s Decisions
a. Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom
The appeal from the Fourth Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery v.
United Kingdom to the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber was decided in December
2011.293 The Grand Chamber began by explaining that the guarantees set forth
in Article 6(3)(d) are “specific aspects of the right to a fair hearing” guaranteed
under Article 6(1), and that the ECtHR’s primary concern under Article 6(1) is
to assess the overall fairness of the proceedings.294 Furthermore, it set out a
general principle for courts to follow:
[B]efore an accused can be convicted, all evidence against him must
normally be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view
to adversarial argument. . . . [T]he accused should be given an
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness
against him, either when that witness makes his statement or at a later
stage of proceedings.295
Noting that “inculpatory evidence against an accused may well be ‘designedly
untruthful or simply erroneous,’” it stated:
[U]nsworn statements by witnesses who cannot be examined often
appear on their face to be cogent and compelling . . . . Experience
shows that the reliability of evidence, including evidence which
appears cogent and convincing, may look very different when
subjected to a searching examination. . . . The Court’s assessment of
whether a criminal trial has been fair cannot depend solely on whether
the evidence against the accused appears prima facie to be reliable, if
there are no means of challenging that evidence once it is admitted.296
Despite this strong defense of the right of cross-examination, the Grand
Chamber departed from its previous bright-line rule that the admission of sole
or decisive, untested hearsay evidence violates Article 6.297 Instead, it held that
the admission of sole or decisive hearsay evidence of absent witnesses “will not
automatically result in a breach of Article 6(1).”298 In place of the bright-line
rule, the ECtHR set out three factors for courts to consider: (1) “whether it was
necessary to admit the witness statements” of an absent witness at trial; (2)
whether the “untested [hearsay] evidence was the sole or decisive basis” for the
conviction; and (3) whether “sufficient counterbalancing factors [existed] . . . to

293.
294.
295.
296.
(1989)).
297.
298.

Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191.
Id. at 243–44, § 118.
Id.
Id. at 251, § 142 (quoting Kostovski v. Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), § 42
Id. at 252–53, § 146.
Id. at 253, § 147.
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ensure that each trial, judged as a whole, was fair within the meaning of [the
Convention].”299
Applying this reasoning to the cases before it, the Grand Chamber found, like
the Fourth Chamber before it, that the hearsay statements in both cases were the
sole or decisive evidence against the defendants.300 However, in reversing the
Fourth Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja, it found that that there were
sufficient counterbalancing factors.301 The counterbalancing factors included:
the fact that the victim’s complaints to her friends were shortly after the alleged
incident; the fact that her recorded statements to police and her statements to her
friends contained only minor inconsistencies; the fact that her friend’s testimony
at trial was subject to cross examination; the strong similarities between her
description of the alleged events and the testimony of the other complainant; and
the fact that the jury was given the instruction to proceed with caution when
considering the hearsay evidence. 302
Conversely, the Grand Chamber upheld the Fourth Chamber’s decision in
Tahery because it did not find sufficient counterbalancing factors.303 The
government argued that the defendant was able to challenge the hearsay by
“giving evidence himself or calling other witnesses who were present.”304 The
court rejected this argument, noting:
Even if he gave evidence denying the charge, [Tahery] was, of course,
unable to test the truthfulness and reliability of [the witness’s
statement] by means of cross-examination. The fact is that [the
witness] was the sole witness who was apparently willing or able to
say what he had seen. [Tahery] was not able to call any other witness
to contradict the testimony provided in the hearsay statement.305

299. Id. at 254, § 152.
300. Id. at 255–56, §§ 154, 160.
301. Id. at 256, § 158 (“[N]otwithstanding the difficulties caused to the defen[s]e by admitting
the statement and the dangers in doing so, there were sufficient counterbalancing factors to
conclude that the admission in evidence of S.T.’s statement did not result in a breach of [Article 6
of the Convention].”).
302. Id. at 255, §§ 156–57.
303. Id. at 257, § 165.
304. Id. at 256, § 161.
305. Id. at 257, § 162. The English courts continue to disagree with the ECtHR on this matter.
A year after the Full Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, the English Court of Appeals
(EWCA) decided R. v. Riat, an appeal that involved five consolidated cases. R. v. Riat, [2012]
EWCA (Crim) 1509 [1] (Eng.). The EWCA addressed the relationship between the English rule
as set forth in R. v. Horncastle and the ECtHR decision in Al Khawaja & Tahery. It noted the
following key principles: (1) English domestic law is—and must be accepted as is—set out in the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003); (2) to the extent that the rulings in Horncastle and AlKhawaja & Tahery differ, English courts are to follow the Horncastle holding; and (3) English
courts should ordinarily only be concerned with the CJA 2003 and the Horncastle decision. Id. [2].
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b. Schatschaschwili v. Germany
The Grand Chamber handed down its most recent decision addressing the
right of confrontation under Article 6 in December 2015. In Schatschaschwili
v. Germany,306 the ECtHR set out to clarify the position it announced in AlKhawaja & Tahery. The facts of this case are as follows.
On October 14, 2006, the defendant and an unidentified accomplice robbed
two Lithuanian national women, L. and I., who were in Germany working as
prostitutes. The robbery occurred late in the evening at their apartment in
Kassel, Germany.307 Four months later, in February 2007, the defendant and
several other accomplices robbed O. and P., two Latvian nationals at their
apartment in Göttingen, Germany. These women were also working as
prostitutes in Germany.308
O. and P. reported the details of these events to their neighbor the following
morning, then immediately left their apartment in Göttingen to stay for a few
days with their friend L., one of the two women robbed approximately four
months earlier.309 Upon arriving to L.’s home, just one day after the robbery
occurred, O. and P. shared the details of their robbery with L., who subsequently
reported it to the police.310 The police interviewed O. and P. about the robbery,
during which time they told the police that they planned to return to Latvia.
Anticipating their unavailability to testify at a subsequent trial, the prosecution
asked the investigating judge to obtain statements from the victims that could
later be used at trial.311
The investigating judge questioned O. and P. at a hearing held on February
19, 2007. However, the defendant was not informed of this hearing because the
judge feared the women would be afraid to tell the truth in the defendant’s
presence. The defendant was arrested in March 2007.312 Neither O. nor P.
attended the trial; in their absence, the judge admitted their police interviews and
the statements they made before the investigating judge.313 There was also other

306. Schatschaschwili v. Germany, No. 9154/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 15, 2015), http://hudoc.ec
hr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159566.
307. Id. at 3, §§ 12–13 (“The perpetrators were aware that the apartment was used for
prostitution and expected its two female occupants to keep valuables and cash there.”).
308. Id. at 4, § 14.
309. Id. at 4, § 18.
310. Id. at 4–5, §§ 18–19.
311. Id. at 5, § 20.
312. Id. at 5, §§ 21–22 (“Witnesses O. and P. returned to Latvia shortly after that hearing.”).
313. Id. at 6–7, § 28.
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evidence that corroborated their statements.314 The defendant was convicted of
two counts of aggravated robbery and extortion.315
The Grand Chamber began its assessment by setting out the three-step
analysis it fashioned in Al-Khawaja & Tahery.316 Regarding the first factor—
whether there existed a good reason for the witness’s absence from trial—the
Chamber held that the absence of a good reason is not in and of itself a violation
of Article 6.317 Nonetheless, it noted that the lack of a good reason for the
witness’s non-attendance at trial “is a very important factor to be weighed in the
balance when assessing the overall fairness of a trial, and one which may tip the
balance in favo[r] of finding a breach of Article 6 [ of the Convention].”318
The Grand Chamber next turned to the second step in the analysis—whether
the conviction was based solely or decisively on the evidence of the absent
witness.319 It noted that the determination of whether the evidence is decisive
turns on the relative strength of the other evidence, particularly the presence of
corroborative evidence.320
With respect to the third step in the analysis—whether there were sufficient
counterbalancing factors—the Chamber identified several factors for courts to
consider in making this determination.321 These included: the presence of
corroborative evidence supporting the declarant’s statements;322 whether the
314. The other evidence presented at trial included: the testimony of the neighbor to whom O.
and P. had reported the robbery shortly after it occurred; the testimony of their friend L. to whom
they also told about the robbery; information obtained from the defendant’s mobile phone; the GPS
receiver from a co-accused’s car; the defendant’s admission that he had been in O. and P.’s
apartment at the time of the robbery; and evidence showing similarities between the Kassel and
Gottingen robberies. Id. at 8–9, § 36.
315. Id. at 7, § 30.
316. Id. at 23–24, §§ 102–07. The three steps in the analysis are: (1) whether a good reason
existed for the absence of the witness at trial; (2) whether the conviction was solely or decisively
based on the statement of the absent witness; and (3) whether sufficient counterbalancing factors
existed “to compensate for the handicaps caused to the defen[s]e as a result of the admission of the
untested evidence and to ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair.” Id. at 24, § 107 (citing
Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191).
317. Id. at 26–27, § 113.
318. Id.
319. It commented that the term decisive “should be narrowly interpreted as indicating
evidence of such significance or importance as is likely to be determinative of the outcome of the
case.” Id. at 26–27, § 113.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 30–32, §§ 125–31. The Grand Chamber stated that because a court must evaluate
the overall fairness of the proceedings, it should assess the existence of sufficient counterbalancing
factors in cases not only where the evidence is sole or decisive, but also where the evidence is found
to “carr[y] significant weight and that its admission may have handicapped the defen[s]e.” Id. at
27–28, § 116.
322. This can include testimony at trial by persons to whom the declarant had reported the
incident shortly after its occurrence, forensic evidence, expert opinions, and similar offenses
committed by the defendant against others provided the witness testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination. Id. at 31–32, § 128.
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defendant was provided the opportunity to question the witness during the
investigation stage of the proceeding;323 and whether the trial court “approached
the untested evidence of an absent witness with caution,” specifically, whether
instructions given to the jury as to the weight it should give this evidence.324
Under this analysis, corroborating evidence has a dual rule: assessing the
probative value of the untested hearsay and determining the presence of
sufficient counterbalancing factors.
In applying the facts of the case before it, the ECtHR found the hearsay
statements were decisive evidence in the conviction because O. and P. were the
only eyewitnesses to the crime.325 Although corroborating evidence was
presented at trial, including the testimony of O. and P.’s friend, L., and their
neighbor, defendant’s admission that he had been at the scene of the crime at the
relevant time and data recordings from cell phones and GPS systems, the Grand
Chamber found that this evidence was “either just hearsay evidence or merely
circumstantial technical and other evidence which was not conclusive as to the
robbery and extortion.”326
In determining whether there were sufficient counterbalancing factors to
compensate for the admission of the hearsay evidence, the Grand Chamber
found that the trial court’s failure to provide an opportunity for the defendant to
question O. and P. during the pretrial proceedings was a serious error.327 It held
that the counterbalancing measures taken by the lower court were insufficient to
provide a “fair and proper assessment of the reliability of the untested evidence”
because of the significant impact O. and P.’s statements had as the only
eyewitnesses to the crime.328
Although the Schatschaschwili Court followed the Al-Khawaja & Tahery
rules, it reached a markedly different result when applying the rules to these
facts. The factors the Al-Khawja & Tajery Court relied on to conclude there
were sufficient counterbalancing factors were also present in
Schatschaschwili—specifically, the similarity of the victim’s statements to
323. Id. at 32, § 130.
324. It added that another important consideration was whether the court provided detailed
reasons for finding the evidence to be reliable. Id. at 31, § 126.
325. Id. at 35, § 144.
326. Id. The Chamber had already determined that there were good reasons for the witnesses’
absence at trial and that the trial court had made reasonable efforts to procure their attendance. Id.
at 34, §§ 139–40.
327. See id. at 38–39, 156–60. It stated:
[W]hile Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention concerns the cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses at the trial itself, the way in which the prosecution witnesses’
questioning at the investigation stage was conducted attains considerable importance for,
and is likely to prejudice, the fairness of the trial itself where key witnesses cannot be
heard by the trial court and the evidence as obtained at the investigation stage is therefore
introduced directly into the trial.
Id. at 38, § 156 (citation omitted).
328. Id. at 39, § 163.
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friends and her recorded statements to police; the opportunity to cross-examine
the friends at trial; and the similarity between this crime and another one the
defendant was accused of committing were also present in Schatschaschwili. In
this case, however, the court appeared to focus solely on the inability of the
defendant to question O. and P. prior to trial in finding that the defendant was
denied the right to a fair trial.329 This appears to signal a swing back from the
Grand Chamber’s previous position and a renewed focus on the prior right to
confrontation.
4. Commentary on the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence
Under the Grand Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, to determine
whether the admission of hearsay statements of a non-attending witnesses
violates Article 6 of the Convention, three key questions must be addressed: (1)
was there a good reason for the non-attendance of the witness; (2) was the
evidence the sole or decisive evidence against the accused; and (3) if the
evidence was the sole or decisive evidence against the defendant, were there
sufficient counterbalancing factors to compensate for the prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the admission of the untested hearsay?330 Those who
favor this approach have argued for a narrowing of the sole or decisive rule,
suggesting that the word “decisive” should be interpreted so that it would include
only evidence so significant that it was likely to be outcome determinative.331
Many are critical of the Grand Chamber’s opinion in Al-Khawaja & Tahery
and the fact that it drastically changed its prior position by abandoning the sole
or decisive evidence rule that had been consistently applied since the 2001 Luca
v. Italy decision.332 In their joint opinion, partly dissenting and partly concurring
in the Al-Khawaja & Tahery decision, Judges Sajó and Karakaş argued that the
Convention does not provide grounds for restricting defense rights.333 They
strongly disagreed with the majority’s position that the common law system can

329. The Grand Chamber particularly took issue with the fact that the absence of the witnesses
was foreseeable to the prosecution, such that it formed the basis for obtaining the statement. The
Chamber held: “Where the investigating authorities took the reasonable view that the witness
concerned would not be examined at the hearing of the trial court, it is essential for the defen[s]e
to have been given the opportunity to put questions to the witness at the investigation stage.” Id.
at 38, § 153 (citation omitted).
330. See Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191.
331. See, e.g., de Wilde, supra note 270, at 163; see also Al-Khawaja & Tahery, 2011-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 263 n.1 (Sajó & Karakaş, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“In our view,
‘decisive’ evidence is reasonably taken to mean evidence without which the prosecuting authorities
could not bring a case.”).
332. Hoyano, supra note 1, at 6.
333. Al-Khawaja & Tahery, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 263–73 (Sajó & Karakaş, JJ., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).

2018]

The Right of Confrontation in the U.S., Canada, and Europe

149

be trusted to assess the reliability of evidence absent confrontation.334 They
criticized the majority for replacing the previous bright-line rule that was
“intended to protect human rights against the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’” with
the “uncertainties of counterbalancing.”335
Professor Liz Heffernan commented that the sole or decisive evidence rule
and the sufficient counterbalancing factors test “lead us into the complex and
potentially fraught terrain of the significance of the contested evidence: its
relationship with the other items of evidence and its strategic importance in the
prosecutorial arsenal.”336 She notes that the ECtHR’s resurgence of rules
allowing corroborating evidence to determine the admissibility of hearsay
“bucks a general trend away from identifying and evaluating the strength of
independent supportive evidence.”337
She finds a “befuddling interplay” between evaluating the strength of the
evidence for purposes of the sole or decisive rule and evaluating corroborative
evidence as a potential counterbalancing factor. Although the ECtHR sets these
out as distinct lines of inquiry, Professor Heffernan explains that in practice they
will operate as “flip-sides of the same coin.”338 The greater degree of
decisiveness of the evidence, the less likely that corroborating evidence will be
present; on the other hand, the stronger the corroboration, the less likely it will
be that the initial evidence is decisive.339 Professor Heffernan concludes that the
ECtHR’s confrontation right remains in a state of considerable uncertainty and
predicts “continued critical reflection on the disputed wisdom of the ECtHR’s
doctrinal compromise embodied in its recent jurisprudence . . . . It invites
renewed focus on our contemporary understanding of fairness in systems of
criminal justice and the role of the ECtHR in ensuring its protection.”340
Professor Laura Hoyano is one of the harshest critics of the Grand Chamber’s
Al-Khawaja & Tahery decision and its directional shift. She criticizes the
ECtHR for abandoning the sole or decisive rule and finds its balancing approach
as “fundamentally misconceived, reflecting a profound misunderstanding of the
right to a fair trial.”341 Pointing to the plain language of Article 6, she
emphasizes that nothing in the language indicates that the right to a fair trial is
334. Id. at 267 (Sajó and Karakas, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“Even
experienced trial judges may erroneously give undue weight to evidence by witnesses whom the
defen[s]e has not cross-examined.”).
335. Id. at 264–65, 273 (Sajó and Karakas, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(“[T]he [ECtHR] has systematically and consistently drawn a bright line, which it has never
abandoned, in the form of the sole or decisive rule. Today this last line of protection of the right to
defen[s]e is being abandoned in the name of an overall examination of fairness.”).
336. Liz Heffernan, Calibrating the Right to Confrontation, 20 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 103,
108 (2016) (U.K.).
337. Id. at 109.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 110.
340. Id.
341. Hoyano, supra note 1, at 6.
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subject to balancing or qualification.342 She adds that Al-Khawaja & Tahery
severs the nexus between the sole or decisive rule and the Article 6(3)(d) right
to challenge prosecutorial evidence, “by suggesting that the rule has no
application where the evidence can be demonstrated by the prosecution to be
reliable.”343
She further criticizes the ECtHR’s shift from considering counterbalancing
factors that were procedural in nature, which were designed to assist defendants
in “overcoming the disadvantage caused by the incursion into the minimum
right” contained in Article 6(3)(d), to an approach that includes the use of
corroborating substantive evidence as a counterbalancing factor to the use of
hearsay. She questions the new approach, which allows additional inculpatory
evidence to be used as a counterbalancing factor that establishes the reliability
of the hearsay statements, asking, “[h]ow can other evidence further loading the
prosecution’s pan on the scales of justice counterbalance the disadvantage to the
defen[s]e of being deprived of the right to challenge the decisive evidence?”344
Finally, she argues that the use of untested hearsay shifts the “equality of arms
institutionali[z]ed in common law and civil law systems” and which serves to
prevent a party from operating at a “substantial disadvantage” against their
opponent.345 She comments that allowing the prosecution to proffer hearsay as
a cornerstone of its case when the defense is not allowed the opportunity to
directly challenge the source of the evidence inevitably results in an unfair trial.
She concludes: “When this process of testing is wholly absent and pertains to
the decisive evidence upon which the conviction rests, then the essence of the
defe[s]e right to contest the prosecution case has evaporated, and so too has the
right to a fair trial.”346
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE JURISDICTIONS
A. Foundational Principles
The following section identifies and compares the foundational principles and
significant factors in the United States, Canada, and ECtHR’s confrontation
jurisprudence. It includes an analysis of how the key cases in each jurisdiction
would likely be decided if they were brought in each of the other two
jurisdictions.
1. Constitutional Protections and Other Enumerated Rights
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 6(3)(d) of the
Convention both contain an enumerated right of confrontation. Canadian
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
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citizens, however, are not afforded this protection as the Canadian Charter does
not contain this explicit right.347 Although the Supreme Court of Canada
recognizes that an accused has an implied right to make a full defense under
section 7 of the Charter, it has noted that this does not specifically include the
right to confrontation.348
The right to a fair trial is the overriding foundational principle repeatedly
recognized in the opinions of the Canadian courts and the ECtHR. In
determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence, Canadian courts evaluate the
concepts of necessity and reliability within the context of the entire trial, seeking
to assure the overall fairness of the trial.349 Similar considerations are present in
the ECtHR’s opinions, which repeatedly state that the right to confrontation is
not an independent right, but rather one that is encompassed in the right to a fair
trial contained in Article 6.350 Conversely, the right to a fair trial is not addressed
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause decisions, where there is little
discussion of how the admissibility of hearsay impacts the overall fairness of the
trial. The Court’s approach since Crawford is a narrow one in which it limits its
analysis to determining whether the hearsay statements are testimonial in
nature.351
2. Reliability
In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the concept of reliability as
the basis for assessing whether a defendant’s constitutional rights had been
violated by the admission of untested hearsay statements.352 Further, although
reliability has been mentioned in both Bryant and Clark, it was obiter dictum in
both cases.353 On the contrary, reliability—alongside necessity—is the
cornerstone of the Canadian principled approach and the primary focus of the
347. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and European Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 251, art. 6, with Canadian Charter, supra note 157.
348. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 39–40.
349. See id. at 8–9 (explaining that Canadian hearsay jurisprudence, though facially concerned
with necessity and reliability, is primarily aimed at ensuring fairness in criminal trials).
350. See Heffernan, supra note 336, at 104 (stating that confrontation is “a core value in the
fair trial rights tradition of the EC[t]HR inasmuch as Article 6(3)(d) lists among the ‘minimum
rights’ to which a criminal accused is entitled the right ‘to examine or have examined witnesses
against him’”).
351. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2–6.
352. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). Writing for the majority in Crawford,
Justice Scalia noted:
Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. There are countless
factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable . . . . Whether a statement is deemed
reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he
accords each of them. Some courts wind up attaching the same significance to opposite
facts.
Id. at 63.
353. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2179–80 (2015); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344,
352–54 (2011).
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Canadian Supreme Court’s opinions.354 The ECtHR’s approach lies somewhere
between those of the United States and Canada. The Grand Chamber’s opinion
in Al-Khawaja & Tahery, with its emphasis on the presence of corroborating
evidence as an essential element in determining counterbalancing factors, makes
it clear that assessing the reliability of the statements, although not central in its
analysis, will be an important consideration in determining whether untested
hearsay should be admissible.355
3. Necessity
The first prong of the Canadian principled approach is necessity, where an
important consideration is the “unavailability of a witness’s courtroom
testimony.”356 However, necessity is not limited to witness unavailability. The
Canadian concept of necessity is founded on “the need to get at the truth,” and
therefore, it is given a flexible meaning consistent with the philosophy
underlying the principled approach.357 Together these considerations have
contributed to judicial findings of necessity in cases where hearsay evidence was
the sole evidence introduced against the defendant.358
On the other hand, in the United States and in the ECtHR, necessity is only
relevant to the concept of witness unavailability. In the United States,
unavailability is a foundational requirement for the admission of testimonial
statements under Crawford and its progeny.359 Similarly, in the ECtHR, the
proponent of the hearsay evidence is required to demonstrate that there was a
good reason for the absence of the witness from the trial.360

354. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 5.
355. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a.
356. PACIOCCO & STUESSER, supra note 163, at 120.
357. Id.; accord Archibald, supra note 4, at 26–27.
358. Professor Archibald has observed an expansive approach to reasonable necessity
following the adoption of the principled approach. He argues that this is due to three factors:
(1) a victim-oriented, crime-fighting set of assumptions linked to judicial assessments of
the legitimacy of claims by classes of vulnerable declarants; (2) a new societal sense of
where truth and justice lie in relation to the systemic treatment of such victims as opposed
to accused persons; and (3) a judicial willingness to adjust hearsay doctrine in the context
of post-Charter judicial activism.
Archibald, supra note 4, at 31–32. This expansive approach to necessity has resulted in an increase
in the amount of hearsay proffered by the prosecution and admitted in criminal trials. To that,
Professor Archibald notes: “The unspoken judicial position seems to be that the credibility of the
justice system lies with crime control rather than a rigorous application of the hearsay exclusion
rooted in adversarial due process concerns.” Id. at 32–33.
359. See McMunigal, supra note 144, at 220–21 (discussing how testimonial statements are
only admissible in a criminal trial if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defense had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
360. See Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, at 244, § 120
(“The requirement that there be a good reason for admitting the evidence of an absent witness is a
preliminary question which must be examined before any consideration is given as to whether that
evidence was sole or decisive.”).
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4. The Probative Value of the Evidence
Under Canada’s principled approach, significant evidence only available
through untested hearsay statements will be admitted upon a judicial finding that
it is reasonably necessary to do so.361 Therefore, the greater the need for the
evidence at trial, the more likely the scales will tip in favor of admission. There
is a marked difference on this issue between the Canadian approach and the
ECtHR approach, where the strength of the evidence is a major consideration in
applying the ECtHR’s sole or decisive evidence rule. Under this doctrine, and
in contrast to the principled approach, the stronger the evidence is, the more
likely it will be found to be the sole or decisive basis for the conviction, and
therefore, will not be admitted in the absence of significant counterbalancing
factors.362 On the other hand, the strength of the untested evidence is of no
significance in a trial court’s decision to admit evidence in the United States.363
5. The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Statement
The facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the statement are a
highly significant factor in the United States and Canada for very different
reasons, and are of no relevance to the ECtHR. Canadian courts must make a
threshold determination of reliability based on the facts and circumstances at
play at the time the statement was made.364 Likewise, the facts and
circumstances existing when statement was made are relevant in the United
States.365 However, they are not relevant in determining whether the statements
are reliable; they are only relevant in determining whether the hearsay statement
is testimonial in nature. Under Crawford and its progeny, courts determine the
primary purpose of the statement based on an objective assessment of the
declarant’s and the interrogator’s intentions at the time the statement was made
and whether there was an ongoing emergency at that time.366
6. Alternative Means of Testing the Hearsay Evidence
A central inquiry in the ECtHR’s right to confrontation doctrine is whether
there are alternative means of testing the hearsay, other than cross-examination
at trial. Of particular importance in cases involving absent witnesses, is whether
361. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 27.
362. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a.
363. See discussion supra Section II.A; accord Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable
Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, supra note 44, at 64–69 (explaining that there is no
consideration of the statement’s evidentiary strength under modern Confrontation Clause analysis,
as set forth in Crawford). Professor Heffernan notes that evidentiary significance plays an inferior
role in common law systems, which explains why “the sole or decisive rule was the very flashpoint
of disagreement between the ECtHR and the English courts.” Heffernan, supra note 336, at 108.
364. See Archibald, supra note 4, at 33–34.
365. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 168–70 (1970).
366. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 (2011).
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there was an opportunity for cross-examination during the pre-trial stage of
proceedings. However, with the Grand Chamber’s decision in Al-Khawaja &
Tahery, the ECtHR effectively shifted from a focus purely procedural in nature
to one that also considered substantive evidence.367 Yet, in Schatschaschwili,
the ECtHR appeared to move back to its previous focus on procedural factors.368
It based this decision solely on the fact that the defendant had not been afforded
a prior opportunity to cross examine the witnesses’ statements during the
investigative hearing, even though there was corroborating evidence supporting
their statements.369
Another critical factor in U.S. jurisprudence is whether there are other means
of testing the evidence beyond the trial itself. Testimonial statements are only
admissible at trial if the defendant was afforded a prior opportunity for crossexamination.370 In contrast, early Canadian cases had a singular focus on
assessing the reliability of the statements through an examination of the facts
and circumstances existing at the time the statements were made. However, in
more recent cases, Canadian courts have noted the importance of procedural
safeguards and the opportunities afforded defendants for cross-examination.371
7. Uniformity
The Canadian principled approach was designed to be applied on a case-bycase basis; thus, by definition, it produces inconsistent decisions. On the
contrary, courts in the United States and the ECtHR, both of which adhere to the
long-established doctrine of stare decisis, have attempted to establish rules
designed to be applied uniformly. Even so, decisions within each of these
jurisdictions cannot be easily reconciled because the determination in the United
States of whether statements are testimonial, and findings by the ECtHR that
367. See de Wilde, supra note 270, at 158.
368. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.b.
369. It is difficult to reconcile the Grand Chamber’s finding that there were sufficient
corroborating factors in Al-Khawaja & Tahery but not in Schatschaschwili. In Al-Khawaja &
Tahery, the Chamber appeared to base its decision regarding defendant Al-Khawaja on the
following corroborating evidence: testimony by another victim of the defendant; testimony by
witnesses to whom the victim had relayed the details of the assault; and the statements of the victim
to the police. Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191. Similar facts
were presented in Schatschaschwili. The corroborating evidence in that case included: the
statements the victims gave to police and the investigating judge; the testimony of their friend and
their neighbor regarding the statements the victims made to them following the robbery; and even
the defendant’s admission to being at the scene of the crime. Yet, in this case, the ECtHR dismissed
this evidence as “merely circumstantial . . . which was not conclusive as to the robbery.”
Schatschaschwili v. Germany, No. 9154/10, at 35, §§ 143–44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 15, 2015). It is
difficult to determine if this represents a movement back to a procedural focus or whether the
ECtHR was troubled by the fact that the investigating judge made the decision to not inform the
defendant, even though it had reason to know that the victims would not return to Germany for the
trial.
370. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
371. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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there are sufficient counterbalancing factors, are highly fact-specific inquiries.
Additionally, recent trends in these jurisdictions have lessened the differences
between them.
Recent decisions of the ECtHR, with its movement away from the previous
bright-line “sole or decisive” rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s fact-specific
inquiry into the “primary purpose” of an interrogation, have resulted in
conflicting decisions.372 Meanwhile, Canadian appellate courts have begun to
provide more particularized criteria for assessing reliability, which is resulting
in more uniform decisions. However, some have noticed that this is unwittingly
creating doctrine that is beginning to replicate the rigid rules the principled
approach was designed to replace.373
B. Case Comparisons and Outcome Predictions
The following section contains a prediction of how the key cases in each
jurisdiction would be decided if they were brought in the other two jurisdictions.
1. Ohio v. Clark
The young boy’s statements to his teachers would likely not be admissible if
this trial were to take place in Canada. L.P.’s statements would not be admissible
under the traditional Canadian hearsay rules, because like the young girl in
Khan, his statements were not contemporaneous with the event. Finding that the
statements would not be admissible under an established hearsay exception,
Canadian courts would then assess the admissibility under the principled
approach.374 Although L.P.’s statements would be found reasonably necessary,
they are not reliable.
The admission of L.P.’s statements at trial would be found reasonably
necessary on two grounds: (1) because L.P. will not be found competent to
testify at the trial;375 and (2) because they are needed to ascertain the truth—in
other words, they are a critical piece of evidence identifying the defendant as his
abuser. However, as mentioned above, it is unlikely that a Canadian court would
find the statements to his teachers to be reliable, based on a review of the facts
372. Two areas where American courts have produced conflicting opinions are autopsy reports
and evidence in sexual abuse cases. See, e.g., Marc D. Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and
Forensic Autopsy Reports–A “ Testimonial”, 74 LA. L. REV. 117, 171 (2013) (forensic autopsy
reports); Julia Chapman, Nursing the Truth: Developing a Framework for Admission of Sane
Testimony Under the Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception and the Confrontation Clause, 50 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 277, 302 (2013) (sexual abuse cases).
373. See discussion supra Section II.B.4.
374. See discussion supra Section II.B.
375. The transcript of the Ohio competency hearing provides indisputable evidence that L.P.
was not able to understand or respond to the simple questions he was asked. See supra note 124
and accompanying text. Section 16.1 of the Canadian Evidence Act provides that persons under
the age of fourteen are presumed incompetent to testify unless “they are able to understand and
respond to questions.” Can. Evid. Act, R.S.C. 2005, c. 32, s. 27, § 16.1(3). It also requires a court
to conduct a hearing if it is concerned about the capacity of the child to testify. Id. § 16.1(5).
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and circumstances surrounding the making of the statements. First, he did not
make the statement naturally and without prompting, a key factor cited by the
Khan Court.376 Second, he did not appear to understand the teachers’ questions
or how to respond to them. Third, he gave a variety of different responses to
these questions and to the questions asked by the state’s child welfare worker.
Based on this, it is likely that he would fail the Khelawon test—whether the
declarant’s statements would change on cross-examination.
Furthermore, although Khelawon allows the use of corroborating evidence to
establish reliability, corroborating evidence in the form of physical evidence of
his injuries would not serve to corroborate L.P.’s statements because he merely
identified the perpetrator, without describing how these injuries occurred.
Finally, the other evidence that was produced at trial, rather than supporting the
reliability of L.P.’s statement identifying Clark as his abuser, suggests a different
conclusion. The fact that L.P.’s mother had her parental rights to three previous
children terminated due to abuse and neglect, L.P. was in her custody the day
before his teachers noticed his injuries, and she refused to return to Ohio from
Washington after the social worker informed her that doctors and the police were
involved all suggest that L.P.’s mother may have been responsible for his
injuries.
Like the Canadian courts, the ECtHR would likely find that L.P.’s statements
should not have been admitted at Clark’s trial. Applying the three prong test set
out in Al-Khawaja & Tahery: (1) whether there was a good reason for the
absence of the witness at trial; (2) whether the evidence of the witness was the
sole or decisive basis for the conviction; and (3) whether there were sufficient
counterbalancing factors to overcome the prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the admission of untested hearsay, the ECtHR would likely conclude that
admission of the statements violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial under
Article 6 of the Convention.377
With respect to the first two elements, there undoubtedly existed a good
reason for L.P.’s absence from trial—he was not competent to testify.
Furthermore, Clark’s conviction clearly was based solely or decisively on the
admission of L.P.’s statements naming him as the perpetrator. In fact, the
prosecutor repeatedly referred to L.P.’s statements in his closing argument, and
the Ohio Supreme Court found that admission of these statements was reversible
error, which required finding that the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Additionally, there does not appear to be any other significant evidence that
would diminish the effect of these statements.
As to Al-Khawaja & Tahery’s third element, the ECtHR would likely
conclude that there were not sufficient counterbalancing factors present in this
case to overcome the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the admission of
these untested hearsay statements. In making this determination, the ECtHR
376. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
377. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a.
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would first assess the reliability of the statements, which will be determined
principally by the existence of corroborating evidence. As previously noted,
although medical evidence was presented as to L.P.’s physical injuries, the
evidence was pertinent only to the type of injuries he suffered. It did not support
the conclusion that Clark inflicted the injuries. As to the other factors relevant
to the ECtHR’s analysis, it does not appear that the trial judge gave cautionary
instructions to the jury regarding these statements, nor was there a prior
opportunity for the defendant to test L.P.’s statements at or before the trial.
2. Schatschaschwili v. Germany
U.S. courts would likely reach the same conclusion as the ECtHR and find
that the women’s statements should not have been admitted at trial. Like Sylvia
Crawford’s statements in Crawford v. Washington, L. and O.’s statements would
be found to be testimonial because they were given at a formal police
interrogation, as well as at a hearing before an investigating judge. Under
Crawford, these testimonial statements can only be admitted if the witnesses
were unavailable378—which they were since they had left Germany and refused
to return for the trial—and if the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination. In this case, the defendant was not afforded this opportunity for
cross-examination, since the German investigating judge refused to provide the
defendant with notice of the hearing.
In contrast, it appears likely that these statements would be admissible in
Canada even though the defendant did not have an opportunity to challenge the
evidence. The hearsay statements would be necessary since the witnesses were
unavailable at trial. Furthermore, applying factors identified in Khewalon, it is
likely that the statements would be found to be reliable on several grounds.379
The women did not appear to have a motive to lie. As the victims, they had
personal knowledge of the events surrounding the robbery. There was also
corroborating evidence to support their statements, including the testimony of
their friends and neighbor to whom they had relayed the details of the robbery;
the defendant’s admissions that he had been in their apartment; and the data and
recordings from the cell phone and GPS system.
3. R. v. Khelawon
Unlike the Canadian courts, courts in the United States are not required to
assess the reliability of the statements the alleged victim made to his caregiver,
his physician, or to the police in which he identified the manager of the nursing
home as his abuser. Therefore, assuming these statements would not fit within
an exception to the hearsay rules, only the videotaped statements that he made
to the police would be found to be testimonial and therefore not admissible at

378. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
379. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
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trial.380 Conversely, the other statements would not be testimonial because,
under Davis and Bryant, an objective declarant in his position would not think
that the statements made to his caregiver or to his physician would likely be used
in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
In contrast, the ECtHR would likely find that admission of his statements
violated the Convention. First, they would be considered sole or decisive
evidence because his statements appear to be the only evidence identifying the
defendant as the perpetrator. Second, these untested statements would violate
the Convention because there does not appear to be sufficient counterbalancing
factors present in this case. Moreover, although there were other nursing home
residents who similarly claimed that the defendant had abused them, which was
a factor the Al-Khawaja & Tahery Court found significant, the very same facts
were not found to constitute a sufficient counterbalancing factor in the recent
Schatschaschwili decision. Rather, the ECtHR found the more important
consideration to be the fact that there was no opportunity for the defendant to
cross-examine the victim who was the only eyewitness to the events. The same
is true in this case, Khelawon had no opportunity to cross-examine the only
eyewitness since the elderly declarant died before the trial.
C. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Doctrines
In criminal trials, the state’s interest in the successful prosecution of criminal
offenses and the corresponding need for evidence stands alongside the need to
assure a level playing field in which a defendant’s right to challenge the evidence
is of paramount importance. The three distinct confrontation doctrines that have
developed in the United States, Canada, and the European Court of Human
Rights, along with the changes that each of these doctrines have undergone in
the previous two decades, reflect the difficulties courts encounter as they
struggle to balance the competing interests at stake. This final section addresses
the strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches and ends with a brief
discussion of what the U.S. Supreme Court can learn from these other
jurisdictions.
Canadian courts adopted the principled approach to the admission of hearsay
statements in the 1990s in response to a perceived need to improve the
prosecutions of sexual offenses. The result was a doctrine that courts apply on
a case-by-case basis with the focus placed on the dual elements of necessity and
reliability.381 One strength of the principled approach is its requirement of
necessity. Hearsay statements should not be admissible in criminal trials unless
it can be clearly demonstrated that the declarant is unavailable to testify at the
trial.
However, the principled approach has two significant flaws. The first is the
case-by-case approach, under which the doctrine of stare decisis carries little
380. There did not appear to be an ongoing emergency at the time.
381. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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legal weight in a court’s determination regarding the admission of evidence. The
resulting lack of uniform justificatory standards has serious deleterious effects
on a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The second significant weakness of the principled approach is the importance
that reliability plays in the decision to admit untested hearsay evidence along
with the use of corroborating evidence as indicia of reliability. It is interesting
to note that Canadian courts adopted this approach at a time when it was being
seriously questioned in the United States—Ohio v. Roberts focus on reliability
as the key factor in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence—and that
would be abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court a little over a decade later, on
grounds that it failed to adequately protect a defendant’s rights.
The serious flaws associated with the reliability approach have been
recognized by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR and the U.S. Supreme Court
alike. These particular quotes were previously introduced in this Article, but
warrant repeating here. The ECtHR noted:
Experience shows that the reliability of evidence, including evidence
which appears cogent and convincing, may look very different when
subjected to a searching examination. . . . The Court’s assessment of
whether a criminal trial has been fair cannot depend solely on whether
the evidence against the accused appears prima facie to be reliable, if
there are no means of challenging that evidence once it is admitted.382
Additionally, Justice Scalia fittingly posited the following: “Dispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with
a jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”383
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence too has
important strengths and considerable weaknesses. With Crawford, the Court
correctly moved from a reliability-based approach, to one intended to protect the
enumerated right to confrontation plainly set out in the Sixth Amendment.
Further, the Court’s bright-line rule—that the Constitution demands
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination—stems directly
from the plain language of the Amendment. However, in the cases following
Crawford, the Court has struggled to produce legal doctrine consistent with these
principles. The Court’s sole focus on determining whether a hearsay statement
is testimonial, along with its associated primary purpose test, is seriously
defective for the reasons previously addressed in this Article.384 The principle
defect of the testimonial doctrine is the foundational premise that a statement
becomes “testimony” at the time it is made, rather than the point in time at which
the evidence is proffered at trial.
Like Canada and the United States, the doctrine developed by the European
Court of Human Rights has its strengths, but also has important weaknesses. In
382. Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. United Kingdom, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, at 251, § 142.
383. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
384. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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its early decisions, the ECtHR practiced a strict interpretation of Article 6 of the
Convention and employed a bright-line rule. It consistently held that if the
untested hearsay evidence was found to be the sole or decisive evidence against
the defendant at trial, the admission of this evidence in criminal trials violated a
defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6, unless the witness was shown to
be unavailable to testify at trial and there had been a prior opportunity for crossexamination.385
There is much to be said for bright-line rules, particularly because they result
in predictable and uniform jurisprudence. However, courts are tempted to—and
frequently will—detour from these rules principally in cases involving
vulnerable victims. In recent cases, the ECtHR altered its position in what
appears to be a response to the harsh criticism directed at it from the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom following the Fourth Chamber’s decision in AlKhajawa & Tahery.
In departing from its bright-line rule, the Grand Chamber modified the rules
to allow for the admission of untested hearsay that is the sole or decisive
evidence against the defendant if there are “sufficient counterbalancing factors”
to overcome the prejudice to the defendant from the admission of this
evidence.386 The fact that a witness might not be available would not, standing
alone, prohibit the admission of the statements. Additionally, the ECtHR
introduced the notion that corroborating evidence should be taken into account
in the determination of whether the hearsay is the sole or decisive evidence.
Finally, regarding the issue of whether there are sufficient counterbalancing
factors, corroborating evidence should be considered among the other evidence
that a court looks to in resolving the question.387
With that said, a significant strength of the ECtHR’s doctrine remains its focus
on the strength of the proffered evidence.388 The UKSC was highly critical of
using the sole or decisive rule as the dispositive factor, commenting that it is
difficult to make this determination at the beginning of a trial,389 but this
argument is wrong. Judges, including common law judges, are more than
capable of assessing the strength of a particular piece of evidence at the
beginning of, or during, a trial.390 In fact, the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize this and require the judge to function as a gatekeeper, and in this

385. See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
386. Al-Khawaja & Tahery, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 253, § 147.
387. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.a.
388. Although U.S. courts similarly evaluate the strength of the evidence, this analysis comes
into play on appeal from a conviction. Those courts will decide whether there was reversible error,
which requires a determination of whether the error complained of was outcome determinative.
See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162–63 (1970).
389. See R v. Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 [108], [87]–[90].
390. See supra note 218 and accompanying text; accord 5 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702:5 (7th ed. 2016).
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regard, mandate judges to make many decisions affecting the admissibility of
evidence that require this type of evaluative assessment.391
The ECtHR has been soundly criticized, and rightly so, for its use of
corroborating evidence. As noted previously, Professor Heffernan criticizes the
ECtHR for using corroborating evidence as both a factor in the determination of
the sole or decisive evidence and as a factor in evaluating the sufficient
counterbalancing factors; she correctly notes that they are “flip-sides of the same
coin.”392 Under this approach, the stronger the corroborating evidence, the less
likely the hearsay will be found sole or decisive, resulting in the admission of
the evidence. The other side of the coin shows that the stronger the corroborative
evidence, the more likely the court will find sufficient counterbalancing factors
that support admission.393 The opposite is also true: the weaker the
corroborative evidence, the more likely the hearsay evidence will be sole or
decisive, and the less likely that the court will find sufficient counterbalancing
factors. Therefore, the use of corroborative evidence as a counterbalancing
factor appears meaningless since it has no effect on the overall analysis.
Conversely, there are two important factors that the ECtHR includes in
determining counterbalancing factors. The first factor is whether the defense
had a prior opportunity to question the unavailable hearsay declarant. It is
important to note the marked differences in the Grand Chamber’s opinions in
Al-Khawaja & Tahery and Schatschaschwili—what appears to be a shift away
from the ECtHR’s use of corroborative evidence and a renewed emphasis on the
ability to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.394 The second important
counterbalancing factor is whether the trial court approached the question of
untested evidence with caution, specifically whether the judge provided
adequate instructions to the jury as to the weight that should be assigned to this
evidence.395
There are some important lessons that the U.S. Supreme Court can take from
these other jurisdictions. First, like Canada and the ECtHR, the Court should
retain the unavailability requirement and admit untested hearsay only upon a
showing by the prosecutor that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.
Second, the Court should abandon its recent attempts to reintroduce reliability
into its Confrontation Clause doctrine. In Crawford, the Court correctly
separated the constitutional questions from the evidence issues when it
abrogated the rule from Ohio v. Roberts. These should remain independent
issues especially because confrontation is a right enumerated in the Sixth
391. For instance, Rule 403 requires a court to determine the prejudicial value of a particular
piece of evidence in comparison to its probative value determined in light of the other proffered
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (demonstrating an evaluative assessment
to the admission of expert testimony).
392. Heffernan, supra note 336, at 109.
393. See discussion supra Section II.C.4.
394. See supra notes 329, 369 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. Furthermore, a reliability approach fails to provide adequate
protections to defendants for the reasons previously addressed in this Article.
The use of corroborating evidence to support the reliability of untested hearsay
is fraught with a myriad of issues.
The Court should move from its current singular focus on the primary purpose
test. As noted previously,396 this jurisprudence has become a “debacle,” a
“mess,” “highly subjective, fact-intensive,” and “malleable” and no longer
adequately protects defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. A modified version
of the ECtHR’s doctrine could be adopted in its place. Adopting the sole or
decisive evidence rule eliminates the current arbitrary decision-making
regarding whether a person is a “witness” at the time he or she makes a
statement. In its place would be a rule predicated on the understanding that the
hearsay is testimony when it is proffered at the trial. With this understanding,
the focus of the inquiry is placed first on assessing the strength of the evidence.
Courts, along with the parties involved, need only be concerned about evidence
that is likely to result in a defendant’s conviction.
However, unlike ECtHR’s current test, the rule put forth should include only
procedural safeguards as counterbalancing factors, with the critical question
being whether the defendant was ever afforded an opportunity to question the
witness. The right to confrontation is a procedural right that should not be
diminished by the substantive evidence present in the case. Although criminal
pre-trial procedures in the United States generally do not include the type of
judicial investigatory hearings found in many civil law European countries, it is
possible to preserve testimony by affording the defendant an opportunity to
question a witness at a pre-trial deposition. In cases involving vulnerable
witnesses, or where law enforcement fears a witness will not be available at the
time of trial, courts can make use of pre-trial depositions, which can provide
defendants an opportunity to question the witness. As Professor Hoyano noted,
“[t]he right to a fair trial is also an inconvenient right.”397 So too is the
enumerated right to confrontation set out in the Sixth Amendment. Enforcing
these rights will sometimes result in the exclusion of hearsay statements where
a defendant was not afforded an opportunity to challenge the evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three distinct confrontation doctrines have developed in the United States,
Canada, and the European Court of Human Rights as courts in these jurisdictions
have struggled to balance the state’s interest in the prosecution of criminal
offenses with the need to protect a defendant’s right to challenge the evidence
presented at trial. The U.S. Supreme Court abandoned its previous reliability
approach over twenty years ago because it found the test, in the words of Justice

396. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
397. Hoyano, supra note 1, at 28.
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Scalia, to be an “amorphous, if not entirely subjective concept.”398 However, its
replacement—the testimonial statement approach—has proven to be not only
illogical, but indeed turned out to be an amorphous, if not entirely subjective
concept that fails to adequately protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.
The Canadian principled approach, with its case-by-case assessment of the
reliability of evidence, is also deeply flawed. The principled approach fails to
provide sufficient guarantees of predictability and uniformity, essential elements
of a criminal justice system, which puts the promise of justice contained in the
Charter’s right to a fair trial at risk.
Of the three approaches, the doctrine established by the ECtHR best protects
an accused’s right not to have untested evidence from non-attending witnesses
admitted at trial. Although the ECtHR has been criticized recently for
abandoning its bright-line sole or decisive evidence rule, this approach is still
favored over the Canadian and U.S. doctrines because it requires an evaluation
of the strength of the evidence, which properly recognizes the amount of
prejudice a defendant will experience from the admission of the untested
evidence. Furthermore, this approach also requires a court to examine the
procedural measures that the trial court put in place to offset the prejudice
resulting from the admission of the untested hearsay.

398. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
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